It just suddenly struck me that if the evolution of big corporations (like, REALLY big - think ConAgra, DuPont and Mitsubishi, who have a stake in almost everything from broilers, cattle, crops, flour, automobiles, chemicals, tobacco to shipping) and the reality of their monopoly status is anything to go by, I think we are truly seeing a new form of governance emerging. Actually, if the traditional definition of a state is slightly tweaked, giant corporations won't merely be new forms of governance; they WILL be the new governments.
The Persistence of Realism
Realist literature emphasizing the unexpired role of the state will always draw our attention back to how different states, all essentially representations of governance and power, have robustly existed to this present day. In the process, their intellectual underpinnings have been battered by inquiry and skepticism in the light of capitalism and globalisation, but they have pulled through with little scratches. States still exert their authority on people in our modern day and age (perhaps even more so than ever) and in a remarkable way their physical evolution appears ever so insignificant, despite some changes that people who are only scratching at the surface exclaim about.
For example, some will assert that states have less physical control over people now that violence has lost its trendiness. Let's not consider third world countries for obvious reasons, but even in developed states, their control over populations is still as gripping as ever through non-physical means, such as policy driven by economics - your livelihood is now in the hands of bureaucrats who have ties and interests in certain industries. This is somewhat indirect control, but still as powerful as ever. Still, others may look at the global world today and point out that many global players now have the power to influence a powerful country like the US because of interconnectedness through trade and globalisation. But, do recall that it is precisely a system like this that the US wants and every country that is playing the global trade game today often had no choice but to join in, in the process having their traditions and cultures infiltrated by Americanisation (Ikenberry, 2002). This once again points to the realist nature of state self-interest.
The evolution process of states is remarkably sly and efficient. States waged war a few centuries ago to get power and expand territories because physical power through technological weaponry was the key. Monarchies rose as a result and colonialism became popular as undeveloped countries could be exploited for their resources. Later, the laws established by the international community after World War II outlawed violence and discrimination while upholding human rights and rule of law (paving the way for the spread of democracy while demolishing monarchies, colonialists, autocracies and dictatorships). States didn't sit still on that; to survive they embraced the new ideal - capitalism - and created new routes for conquest by seemingly focusing on economics rather than politics, while at the same time blocking off the surveillance of human rights by using the rule of law as a disguise for legitimacy. Legitimacy creates the moral support for a state to engage in its political dealings - The US was now free to impose itself on undemocratic countries as they were perceived as evil.
It is like how we think that a company that plants its own trees in order to produce paper is being environmentally considerate and therefore not 'bad', when in fact the mass production of the same types of trees in one plot of land (monoculture) is extremely detrimental to the ecosystem and we let it go unchallenged.
And even then, to think of states as now focusing on economics rather than politics seems to fall short of the defining nature of politics and power. I think it is actually more correct to say that economics is now the new form of politics that governments have come to employ in order to further their own interests.
The Growth of the Political Corporation
State and liberty are directly opposed, so they say. Capitalists, liberal economists and right-wing intellectuals will assert the undermining of the state when the free market prevails. When the history of agriculture and cattle farming is observed, such production has evolved from one where the unit of production is the self-reliant family - each family produced its own food from seed to plate with little surplus and with little purchase of capital - to one that consisted of many firms breaking up the production process and a lot of specialisation between a century to half a century ago (which would be argued to be a good example of a properly working free market) to one that is now shaped like an hourglass in our contemporary society - thousands of farmers at the top (production) and millions of consumers at the bottom, with only about four behemoth corporations in the middle controlling the entire process. The power relations are incredibly skewed in favour of these big corporations - one can pretend to imagine how competitive such a market can be. They have plenty of leverage in their hands.
These corporations got to where they are through mergers and acquisitions, in the process carrying out horizontal and vertical integration. It is hard to topple these big corporations because they have resources to waste in order to distort the market in their favour (and, as an afterthought, physical damage to them is not an option since war has been deemed illegal and being cut off from the goods they supply you might kill you). Their place in society has been cemented by their involvement with populations of people through the provision of services. In effect, they have so many dealings in a complex, inter-related web of production such that they have profoundly infiltrated the lives of people and have become indispensable, and interestingly this is much like states do.
This is where it begins to hit me that there is little that distinguishes a giant, integrated and monopolistic corporation from a state - both are revenue-collecting, bureaucratic, conquest-driven, coercive and politically powerful forms of governing/dominating a population. The political power of monopolies and governments require little elaboration. With political power, monopolies and governments have the capacity to reduce the liberties of people through coercion. Monopolistic corporations seek to gain ground and get bigger, as much as governments have been doing through imperialism, colonialism and war in the past. Both giant corporations and governments are characteristically administrative, impersonal and bureaucratic. Most importantly, corporations and governments both seek revenue from the people they 'serve', one through the sale of products and the other through taxation. It is this exchange of services for money that creates a social contract between the service-provider and the people, and in effect a form of state accountability and legitimacy is established. Conquest and taxation has historically been the precedent for states to gain basic legitimacy for existence in the eyes of their own citizens (Tilly, 1975).
At this moment, such a link between a corporation and governance may still seem unclear, but given the free rein that big corporations are increasingly bestowed with now (much of which is, admittedly, earned), there seems little to stop these corporations from casting their nets further and even taking over government functions once the time is right. Already, Big-Four-ish corporations are attempting to control more than just what they initially started out to do. Having more hands in different sectors of the market serves to facilitate the corporation's ability to control and establish power. As Hefferman (1998) argues, "economic power, not efficiency, predicts survival", directly refuting the assertion that it is efficiency which enables a firm to stay afloat in the competitive market. Even if this hypothesis is true though, I wouldn't expect it to happen any time soon - such a new world order would require a thorough remoulding of people's understanding of government before it can be accepted as politics. But we have seen it happen before when people replaced their chiefs with emperors, their emperors with dictators, their dictators with autocrats, and their autocrats with diplomats. Every one of these leaders have been politicians. The new guy might just be the corporate rat - and 'rat' might even be old.
Implications
Have we then created the robot that actually destroys its master when we allow corporations to assume political power? The objective and rational free market may breed a new form of statism if corporations rise to the level of government. Or is this merely another evolutionary path for states to prevail, as we have seen through the ages the rise of monarchies, autocracies, democracies and now corporations depending on what is fashionable (and provides access to political power) at that moment in time?
The important takeaway for me at least is that the corporation could very well completely replace the government one day, and that would be normal. Some might even hail it as 'progress'. It's not the Microsofts and McDonalds'es we're looking at, but rather the ones who can creep right into the very fabric of society such that everything you wear, eat and do has something to do with them. That's what makes corporations like Cargill and ConAgra scary - they're obscure and almost unheard of, but they mastermind the production of many of the things we purchase, from where the crops and cattle are grown to the shipment, transport and logistics, right down to the smallest chemical additives and ingredients in our food. Maybe in the future, the CEO of Singapore Dominance Pte. Ltd. could really be our prime minister, or the head of some Big-4 company could be the hegemonic president of the world. It would probably be some dude who broke down trade walls across the globe and has his fingers in many pies. In that hypothetical future, we would allow some corporate person to make policy decisions for us - who better than a shrewd business man in an economic world huh? It's just the emperor wearing new clothes.
Still, there is something universal (and thus intellectually beautiful) about how it unfolds. At the very heart of it, human nature drives each outcome. States are a spectre of the collective will of power-hungry people.
Bibliography
Hefferman, W. D. (1998). Agriculture and monopoly capital, Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine, 50(3), 46-61.
Ikenberry, G. J. (ed.) (2002). American Unipolarity: The Sources of Persistence and Decline" in America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 285-310.
Tilly, C. (1975). The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Showing posts with label political science. Show all posts
Showing posts with label political science. Show all posts
Tuesday, 20 October 2009
Saturday, 12 September 2009
A Skimpy Caveat To Liberalism
A contemporary thought on the changing landscape of global power is that of the prominent rise of China and the apparent decline of the US as a hegemonic power.
Authors such as Ikenberry have elegantly conceived of the possibly of such an occurrence of China overtaking the US and becoming the new global power as not happening because the structure of global politics defies history - the globalised world today doesn't play by conventional rules of interstate relations.
For one, the decisiveness of nuclear weapons in settling a war has rendered the possibility of a world war - the classical instrument for overthrowing the world order - unlikely. Secondly, the global institution based on the principles of capitalism created by the US after World War II is one that is 'hard to overturn and easy to join'. Thirdly, the many agents within the system ensure that any drastic action by any one is kept in check by a collective governance of states.
The trade regime in place creates a huge incentive for states to cooperate rather than resort to conflict. With more states within the Western order, the more wealth there is to create and gain, and the more likely one will lose out if one doesn't join in the trading playing field.
This economically-dominant system is seen as vastly different from global systems led by hegemons in the past, when the world order was created and run by the state with the greatest physical force. This contemporary and globalised world order appears benign and inclusive, more liberal than imperial, brings democracies and market societies closer together and facilitates the participation and integration of both global powers and newly developed states. This US-led world order also caters to the interests of market societies, creating incentives for states to participate and avoid being left out.
If the US focuses its efforts not in beefing the power of its country up but in ensuring that the Western order is enforced to encourage engagement, integration and restraint, countries that are rising global powers will have no choice but to play by the rules that have been established. China's economic rise is imminent, but remains checked by the system that is highly interdependent among many states. China's policy changes suggest that Chinese leaders do recognize the inevitable advantages of playing by these rules as they have increasingly embraced global trade rules.
However, history always has a sly and enduring way of ensuring that trends never change. It may be argued that the global system now may buck the trend simply because it is different. However, there is the chance that the global trade regime may fail to hold as the declining hegemonic power - The US - does what any declining power will typically do - it will desperately try to secure its own interests. One can observe this happening in its increasingly protectionist measures and socialist policies which signal its lack of commitment to the global world trading order it created and would constrain the growth of other global powers with.
By loosening its position as the foremost supporter of the global system of governance that underpins the world order, there can be (and is) increasing disincentive for countries to open up their doors to trade and resort to protectionist measures, causing liberal trade to collapse (this is especially highlighted by the neverending difficulty in ratifying trade agreements during WTO meetings). The weakening interdependence among countries can allow runaway global powers to attempt to rise up and overthrow the world order which would otherwise have been kept intact by the many countries it serves.
This seems to me to be another possible case of power shifting history occurring again, and it would signal a sense of inevitability when it comes to the tyranny of history's dictates - there can be no system so privileged that it that escapes the trend of the past.
Realists will also love to contend that the cooperation that liberalists like to proclaim as good between countries isn't so much a harmonious feature of interstate relations, but rather one that is chock-full of political conflict. As Keohane points out, harmony occurs when everyone's interests naturally align, but cooperation occurs because conflict or potential conflict arises, and cooperation then entails that patterns of behaviour must be altered.
Game theorists have shown that strategies that involve threats, punishments, promises and rewards are more effective in attaining cooperative outcomes than those that rely on persuasion, often the cornerstone of the capitalist's argument for the free market.
Cooperation hence does not imply an absence of conflict. Without the looming potential of conflict, there is no need for cooperation. The role of realism in focusing on the insecurities between states is still prevalent.
So, it is still early yet to say for sure if the new world order can hold out and that realism is dead in the idealised promise of liberal theory.
Authors such as Ikenberry have elegantly conceived of the possibly of such an occurrence of China overtaking the US and becoming the new global power as not happening because the structure of global politics defies history - the globalised world today doesn't play by conventional rules of interstate relations.
For one, the decisiveness of nuclear weapons in settling a war has rendered the possibility of a world war - the classical instrument for overthrowing the world order - unlikely. Secondly, the global institution based on the principles of capitalism created by the US after World War II is one that is 'hard to overturn and easy to join'. Thirdly, the many agents within the system ensure that any drastic action by any one is kept in check by a collective governance of states.
The trade regime in place creates a huge incentive for states to cooperate rather than resort to conflict. With more states within the Western order, the more wealth there is to create and gain, and the more likely one will lose out if one doesn't join in the trading playing field.
This economically-dominant system is seen as vastly different from global systems led by hegemons in the past, when the world order was created and run by the state with the greatest physical force. This contemporary and globalised world order appears benign and inclusive, more liberal than imperial, brings democracies and market societies closer together and facilitates the participation and integration of both global powers and newly developed states. This US-led world order also caters to the interests of market societies, creating incentives for states to participate and avoid being left out.
If the US focuses its efforts not in beefing the power of its country up but in ensuring that the Western order is enforced to encourage engagement, integration and restraint, countries that are rising global powers will have no choice but to play by the rules that have been established. China's economic rise is imminent, but remains checked by the system that is highly interdependent among many states. China's policy changes suggest that Chinese leaders do recognize the inevitable advantages of playing by these rules as they have increasingly embraced global trade rules.
However, history always has a sly and enduring way of ensuring that trends never change. It may be argued that the global system now may buck the trend simply because it is different. However, there is the chance that the global trade regime may fail to hold as the declining hegemonic power - The US - does what any declining power will typically do - it will desperately try to secure its own interests. One can observe this happening in its increasingly protectionist measures and socialist policies which signal its lack of commitment to the global world trading order it created and would constrain the growth of other global powers with.
By loosening its position as the foremost supporter of the global system of governance that underpins the world order, there can be (and is) increasing disincentive for countries to open up their doors to trade and resort to protectionist measures, causing liberal trade to collapse (this is especially highlighted by the neverending difficulty in ratifying trade agreements during WTO meetings). The weakening interdependence among countries can allow runaway global powers to attempt to rise up and overthrow the world order which would otherwise have been kept intact by the many countries it serves.
This seems to me to be another possible case of power shifting history occurring again, and it would signal a sense of inevitability when it comes to the tyranny of history's dictates - there can be no system so privileged that it that escapes the trend of the past.
Realists will also love to contend that the cooperation that liberalists like to proclaim as good between countries isn't so much a harmonious feature of interstate relations, but rather one that is chock-full of political conflict. As Keohane points out, harmony occurs when everyone's interests naturally align, but cooperation occurs because conflict or potential conflict arises, and cooperation then entails that patterns of behaviour must be altered.
Game theorists have shown that strategies that involve threats, punishments, promises and rewards are more effective in attaining cooperative outcomes than those that rely on persuasion, often the cornerstone of the capitalist's argument for the free market.
Cooperation hence does not imply an absence of conflict. Without the looming potential of conflict, there is no need for cooperation. The role of realism in focusing on the insecurities between states is still prevalent.
So, it is still early yet to say for sure if the new world order can hold out and that realism is dead in the idealised promise of liberal theory.
Saturday, 21 June 2008
Gender Realism = All Men Only Want Sex = All Women Only Want Money, For Example.
For the uninitiated in basic political philosophy, I apologise for the technicality.
The school of realist thought contends that essentially, countries are keen and only keen on preserving the survival of the state through self-help. This means that nothing else matters other than being wary of your neighbours and you'd only be able to trust yourself, so you build up your own offences and defences. Through a vicious cycle of insecurity between nations, there will always be hostility and inevitably war.
The school of liberalist thought asserts that there is more to it than just the necessity of statism, survival and self-help, because modern politics seems to be moving towards that of peace treaties and goodwill on the sugar-coated side. If we can afford to do these things, then there must be some room for being optimistic about peace and cooperation.
But I'm not writing about what explains why countries want to bomb the crap out of one another or selectively treat one another like gay bosom pals. I'm posting today about gender realism. Along the 'all men only want sex' and 'all women only want money' variety of sentiment, we have others like 'all women secretly want bad boys and fast cars', 'all men are scumbags', 'all women are bitches' etc. Essentially, this is what I'd define as gender realism.
On the other hand, stuff like 'I don't think all men are scumbags, my boyfriend is definitely not one of them' or 'my girlfriend is the exception to the general adage that women only want men with status' belongs under gender liberalism. Likewise, men having 2 ladders under the ladder theory and 'personality is more important than looks' hence also fall under gender liberalist thought by my definitions.
The general conflict between realism and liberalism since the early 1900s is that life for the realist, at the end of the day, is all about protecting yourself in an innately rational and selfish manner. Life for the liberalist would be that we can afford to be genuinely altruistic and life isn't all about self-survival. The lengthened conflict then goes on to debate whether liberalism is essentially sugar-coated realism. Take for example the IMF or the WTO. Liberalists will say that you can draw on these examples to show that countries can indeed seek to further goodwill for everyone's gain. Realists will say that the IMF and WTO are merely tools that America is using to further their personal interests on a global scale, in the process enslaving developing countries and forcing them to play by their rules.
Accordingly, it can then be argued that, for example, men, especially the sensitive new-age ones, are only being sensitive and nice insofar as they wish to succeed in getting into women's pants ultimately. In line with liberalism being disguised realism, a guy's attempt to be nice and sensitive are just more cunning ways to get sex, and a lady's attempt to be a witty and new-age confident woman is just so that she can get men of stature and their dough.
To digress a little, it is like when a company decides to engage in CSR (corporate social responsibility). Liberalists will say that they want to reach out to stakeholders, realists will assert that they're simply doing this just to exploit the CSR channel to market their firm and get more profits.
Fundamentally, anyone who asserts that all men and women are rootedly the same because of a host of scientific, rational reasons - biological, Darwinistic, etc - is a gender realist. As long as the status quo is met, it doesn't matter by what means.
With Congress, every time they make a joke it's a law; and every time they make a law it's a joke.
Audio Candy:
Talib Kweli Feat. Mos Def & Kanye West - Get By
The school of realist thought contends that essentially, countries are keen and only keen on preserving the survival of the state through self-help. This means that nothing else matters other than being wary of your neighbours and you'd only be able to trust yourself, so you build up your own offences and defences. Through a vicious cycle of insecurity between nations, there will always be hostility and inevitably war.
The school of liberalist thought asserts that there is more to it than just the necessity of statism, survival and self-help, because modern politics seems to be moving towards that of peace treaties and goodwill on the sugar-coated side. If we can afford to do these things, then there must be some room for being optimistic about peace and cooperation.
But I'm not writing about what explains why countries want to bomb the crap out of one another or selectively treat one another like gay bosom pals. I'm posting today about gender realism. Along the 'all men only want sex' and 'all women only want money' variety of sentiment, we have others like 'all women secretly want bad boys and fast cars', 'all men are scumbags', 'all women are bitches' etc. Essentially, this is what I'd define as gender realism.
On the other hand, stuff like 'I don't think all men are scumbags, my boyfriend is definitely not one of them' or 'my girlfriend is the exception to the general adage that women only want men with status' belongs under gender liberalism. Likewise, men having 2 ladders under the ladder theory and 'personality is more important than looks' hence also fall under gender liberalist thought by my definitions.
The general conflict between realism and liberalism since the early 1900s is that life for the realist, at the end of the day, is all about protecting yourself in an innately rational and selfish manner. Life for the liberalist would be that we can afford to be genuinely altruistic and life isn't all about self-survival. The lengthened conflict then goes on to debate whether liberalism is essentially sugar-coated realism. Take for example the IMF or the WTO. Liberalists will say that you can draw on these examples to show that countries can indeed seek to further goodwill for everyone's gain. Realists will say that the IMF and WTO are merely tools that America is using to further their personal interests on a global scale, in the process enslaving developing countries and forcing them to play by their rules.
Accordingly, it can then be argued that, for example, men, especially the sensitive new-age ones, are only being sensitive and nice insofar as they wish to succeed in getting into women's pants ultimately. In line with liberalism being disguised realism, a guy's attempt to be nice and sensitive are just more cunning ways to get sex, and a lady's attempt to be a witty and new-age confident woman is just so that she can get men of stature and their dough.
To digress a little, it is like when a company decides to engage in CSR (corporate social responsibility). Liberalists will say that they want to reach out to stakeholders, realists will assert that they're simply doing this just to exploit the CSR channel to market their firm and get more profits.
Fundamentally, anyone who asserts that all men and women are rootedly the same because of a host of scientific, rational reasons - biological, Darwinistic, etc - is a gender realist. As long as the status quo is met, it doesn't matter by what means.
With Congress, every time they make a joke it's a law; and every time they make a law it's a joke.
Audio Candy:
Talib Kweli Feat. Mos Def & Kanye West - Get By
Tuesday, 15 April 2008
The More I Step Into The Sun, The More I Step Out Of The Light
I think it's really intriguing how an idea, a concept, a thought, an answer, or any revelatory or epiphanic conjecture can suddenly materialise in our heads, only after which we figure out the building blocks that led us to that thought. It's like reverse mathematics, when you get the answer and then figure out what the equation or formula was. Our minds can seem really separate and independent of ourselves this way.
In many instances, from finding out from taking intro classes for subjects that really matter to seeing the other side from behind your own fence, there's just so much I do not know.
Edwin brought the laptop back while I was away during the weekend, so I got home last night and spent quite a bit of time tweaking with the settings and stuff. Then exhaustion really hit and I went to sleep and ended up waking up late today. So that leaves me about an hour left before the paper at 1330h to totally sort out my mess of political science.
But I'm not too worried because sometimes nothing is sweeter than confidence in the ability of your strength in a subject you enjoy.
Liberation is imminent!
In science as in love, too much concentration on technique can often lead to impotence.
Audio Candy:
Petey Pablo - Show Me The Money
In many instances, from finding out from taking intro classes for subjects that really matter to seeing the other side from behind your own fence, there's just so much I do not know.
Edwin brought the laptop back while I was away during the weekend, so I got home last night and spent quite a bit of time tweaking with the settings and stuff. Then exhaustion really hit and I went to sleep and ended up waking up late today. So that leaves me about an hour left before the paper at 1330h to totally sort out my mess of political science.
But I'm not too worried because sometimes nothing is sweeter than confidence in the ability of your strength in a subject you enjoy.
Liberation is imminent!
In science as in love, too much concentration on technique can often lead to impotence.
Audio Candy:
Petey Pablo - Show Me The Money
Thursday, 3 April 2008
The First To The Final
This week is the last run of lessons before school's out for the study break next week and subsequent final exams. Econs has been fading and has duly faded away into oblivion as our AskDrMoney prof Larry Haverkamp (yeh he's an economics journalist for The Newpaper) rushed through yet another 376.2 chapters again and abruptly wrapped things up, much to our bewilderment. But nothing new there.
Tuesday also marked the end of the political science intro class under Rahul Sagar. Things wouldn't be so darn sentimental if he wasn't moving away to teach in Princeton, but alas, yes he's leaving SMU. Apparently, Princeton made the top graduate from Harvard an offer he couldn't possibly resist, and who can blame the dude? He'd be really underemployed if he stayed. I'm not particularly proud of thinking that way (in a "we're only second-rate and we're not good enough for him" manner), but that's the reality of the situation I guess.
So we're planning on throwing a party for him after the finals are over. Things are still in the email planning phase (read: LOTS OF SPAM), but we're thinking of baguettes, for his favourite obsession with French political quirks, and whiteboard markers, cos he never has them when he needs them. But yeh he'd be one teacher I'd do this anytime for. I'd love to be able to meet him for a talk about majors and future prospects not only pertaining to political science but social sciences in general as well. I'm particularly curious about what going into academics will entail.
That leaves BGS for tomorrow, where the remainder of the class that hasn't presented last week will be presenting tomorrow. I could've started studying since last Sunday but there's still that pesky BGS report to deal with that keeps gnawing at the back of my mind. The most of this week has surrounded meeting up and working on the report, so hopefully we'll be done by tomorrow so we can bury it dead for once.
Starry Nite, that final-day-of-school pre-exam rock concert, will be on tomorrow too. Richard's performing with his band, Lost in Slumber, this time around. I was slacking around big time in school today with Jacq and Mikaela and I inevitably eavesdropped a little on their conversation as they recalled and talked about the last Starry Nite, which was the exact same kinda time and day last term as tomorrow.
I'm quite amazed at the detail of recollection the both of them managed to come up with. From what people wore to what happened - Früjch, the broken bag, the heels, the CCA room, etc - they were retelling the story of Starry Nite part I in such vibrant colours that a lot of it came flashing back to me as well.
And I guess what really strikes is the distinct notion of change as things are different now from they were just a few months ago, and as Jacq was saying, it really felt as if it was all just yesterday. In a way of looking at it, it's as if as each Starry Nite comes and goes, each one will symbolise a particular moment or phase in time and will have its own story to tell.
I recall my own side of the story too, and it really makes me wonder how on earth things have unfolded this way, because it's quite inexplicable to say the least. In all honesty, it is so weird it is seriously puzzling. That was the first time, and the best time, and I guess I really had my hopes up but time and again they come hurtling down, only that each time it crashes lower and lower, til I'm reaching a point of resignation and apathy. I can only speculate, and I can only choose whether or not to wait.
The laptop's headed for the tech tomorrow as well, so it'll be a while without a computer for me for real this time. Hopefully this induces some degree of studying. 2+ more weeks to socially-accepted slacking.
If you are going to walk on thin ice, you might as well dance.
Audio Candy:
Colbie Caillat - Bubbly
Tuesday also marked the end of the political science intro class under Rahul Sagar. Things wouldn't be so darn sentimental if he wasn't moving away to teach in Princeton, but alas, yes he's leaving SMU. Apparently, Princeton made the top graduate from Harvard an offer he couldn't possibly resist, and who can blame the dude? He'd be really underemployed if he stayed. I'm not particularly proud of thinking that way (in a "we're only second-rate and we're not good enough for him" manner), but that's the reality of the situation I guess.
So we're planning on throwing a party for him after the finals are over. Things are still in the email planning phase (read: LOTS OF SPAM), but we're thinking of baguettes, for his favourite obsession with French political quirks, and whiteboard markers, cos he never has them when he needs them. But yeh he'd be one teacher I'd do this anytime for. I'd love to be able to meet him for a talk about majors and future prospects not only pertaining to political science but social sciences in general as well. I'm particularly curious about what going into academics will entail.
That leaves BGS for tomorrow, where the remainder of the class that hasn't presented last week will be presenting tomorrow. I could've started studying since last Sunday but there's still that pesky BGS report to deal with that keeps gnawing at the back of my mind. The most of this week has surrounded meeting up and working on the report, so hopefully we'll be done by tomorrow so we can bury it dead for once.
Starry Nite, that final-day-of-school pre-exam rock concert, will be on tomorrow too. Richard's performing with his band, Lost in Slumber, this time around. I was slacking around big time in school today with Jacq and Mikaela and I inevitably eavesdropped a little on their conversation as they recalled and talked about the last Starry Nite, which was the exact same kinda time and day last term as tomorrow.
I'm quite amazed at the detail of recollection the both of them managed to come up with. From what people wore to what happened - Früjch, the broken bag, the heels, the CCA room, etc - they were retelling the story of Starry Nite part I in such vibrant colours that a lot of it came flashing back to me as well.
And I guess what really strikes is the distinct notion of change as things are different now from they were just a few months ago, and as Jacq was saying, it really felt as if it was all just yesterday. In a way of looking at it, it's as if as each Starry Nite comes and goes, each one will symbolise a particular moment or phase in time and will have its own story to tell.
I recall my own side of the story too, and it really makes me wonder how on earth things have unfolded this way, because it's quite inexplicable to say the least. In all honesty, it is so weird it is seriously puzzling. That was the first time, and the best time, and I guess I really had my hopes up but time and again they come hurtling down, only that each time it crashes lower and lower, til I'm reaching a point of resignation and apathy. I can only speculate, and I can only choose whether or not to wait.
The laptop's headed for the tech tomorrow as well, so it'll be a while without a computer for me for real this time. Hopefully this induces some degree of studying. 2+ more weeks to socially-accepted slacking.
If you are going to walk on thin ice, you might as well dance.
Audio Candy:
Colbie Caillat - Bubbly
Wednesday, 26 March 2008
Divergent Interpretations
Our clothes mismatch as much as our thoughts
Voices drown out the room
As people go hand in hand, paired
But I linger
Let the voices fade
And you're left, emerged solitarily
Those are some nice shoes
We'll laugh at the party people below from above
Been barely sleeping the past few days, so when there's finally no school again today I slept in til 1400h. Went to school to complete my political science term paper and attend yet another BGS meeting, and then got home rather early. I hardly did anything interesting today and the day seriously felt damn short.
The school connection has been fsckin' up the past few days (or maybe it screwed up bad enough today to feel that way) which kinda disrupted my research a bit. But I've wondered what it'd be like to write a paper without the internet. It'd be crazy I guess not to have all that wealth of information at your disposal, of having to run from shelf to shelf and library to library looking for the journals and articles you need.
I was quite 'in the zone' so I managed to complete my political science term paper, Is Democracy A Universal Value?, in 3 days. I'd attribute it significantly to the fact that I do not have a functional laptop at the moment. Having to rely on the library computers means that I have to get my work done by a certain time and this deadline-peppered daily life kinda ensures that, which isn't all that a bad thing I suppose.
I think I'm starting to get it on how to write social science-related papers, and I must say I actually enjoyed writing my term paper.
Anyway, references and citations really make my crap essays look like graduate school thesis papers.
On a random note, life is somewhat at worst, a constant struggle; at best, never straightforward. I'm just mindboggled sometimes by the infinite possibilities and paths any of us can choose to walk which would have a profound effect on everything else around us, and the past and existence and everything thus far is a very neat unfolding summary of the choices we make and the things we do. Living is never smooth-sailing. Things may seem straightforward for the conformist, but that does not mean he is not presented with choices.
Don't anthropomorphize computers - they hate it.
Audio Candy:
Dixie Chicks - Travelin' Soldier
Voices drown out the room
As people go hand in hand, paired
But I linger
Let the voices fade
And you're left, emerged solitarily
Those are some nice shoes
We'll laugh at the party people below from above
Been barely sleeping the past few days, so when there's finally no school again today I slept in til 1400h. Went to school to complete my political science term paper and attend yet another BGS meeting, and then got home rather early. I hardly did anything interesting today and the day seriously felt damn short.
The school connection has been fsckin' up the past few days (or maybe it screwed up bad enough today to feel that way) which kinda disrupted my research a bit. But I've wondered what it'd be like to write a paper without the internet. It'd be crazy I guess not to have all that wealth of information at your disposal, of having to run from shelf to shelf and library to library looking for the journals and articles you need.
I was quite 'in the zone' so I managed to complete my political science term paper, Is Democracy A Universal Value?, in 3 days. I'd attribute it significantly to the fact that I do not have a functional laptop at the moment. Having to rely on the library computers means that I have to get my work done by a certain time and this deadline-peppered daily life kinda ensures that, which isn't all that a bad thing I suppose.
I think I'm starting to get it on how to write social science-related papers, and I must say I actually enjoyed writing my term paper.
Anyway, references and citations really make my crap essays look like graduate school thesis papers.
On a random note, life is somewhat at worst, a constant struggle; at best, never straightforward. I'm just mindboggled sometimes by the infinite possibilities and paths any of us can choose to walk which would have a profound effect on everything else around us, and the past and existence and everything thus far is a very neat unfolding summary of the choices we make and the things we do. Living is never smooth-sailing. Things may seem straightforward for the conformist, but that does not mean he is not presented with choices.
Don't anthropomorphize computers - they hate it.
Audio Candy:
Dixie Chicks - Travelin' Soldier
Sunday, 23 March 2008
Epiphaniac
Sat through my first international game today - Singapore vs Australia at the old National Stadium - though I was only present for half a game because the match, for some stupid reason or other, started much earlier than the stated time on the ticket and also because I had to queue 20 minutes for KFC which ate into the match time.
There wasn't much to cheer about, only a lot to groan, whine and bitch about considering the number of clear cut chances that Singapore had and squandered. It's really matches like these that make you wish you could be on the pitch playing so badly instead of those chickens monkeying around such that you feel like you're gonna implode on yourself. One other team that never fails to make me feel this way is Newcastle.
Rachel was quite enthusiastic and the others were going on about it and teasing her quite a bit, but soon enough I started getting quite animated myself. Yins, Mikaela and Angie were clearly quite amused for very irrelevant reasons.
The game ended goal-less. The rain really killed things I think. The atmosphere could've been so much better. Catching the Singapore vs Lebanon qualifier match on wednesday; I'm really hoping quite badly that it'll be a great deal better than today's.
Although I've already decided on 'Is Democracy A Universal Value?' for my political science term paper, I've been struggling to simply get started on it since over a week ago. So I decided to try pretending that I was gonna blog on it like some other random pointless topic by typing it out using blogger.com, and everything just started coming out. And I'm quite damn amazed. Just like how I get mental constipation from attempting to do work in the library, using a formal program like Microsoft Word to work on my essay causes my mind to simply shut off because, well it's no surprise anyway, I hate the idea of doing work.
I have interestingly just managed to fool myself. Hmm.
This unofficial 1-week break is effectively screwing up my whole sleeping cycle. I feel as if, without the civiling influence of school and institutional order, I'm naturally revertible to being nocturnal. Can't help it; night time is preciously zen.
And so I start to forget about it and move on, just like that. And when you think about how hard it is, especially perhaps for girls to do so, it makes me wonder what kinda quantum leap it takes for us to be convinced enough to see the light and take the more enlightened path; the path that would have less pointless self-induced suffering. We're inherently wired differently.
And come to think of it, why did I even have those different states of mind? Why did it have to take such circumstances of rude awakenings and the like before I could have a change of heart? Why couldn't it be a matter of my own will to not get trapped? What kinda will power does it take? It is so fascinating. We are truly such experential creatures at the end of the day. :]
Intel has announced its next chip: the Repentium.
Audio Candy:
Stereophonics - Have A Nice Day
There wasn't much to cheer about, only a lot to groan, whine and bitch about considering the number of clear cut chances that Singapore had and squandered. It's really matches like these that make you wish you could be on the pitch playing so badly instead of those chickens monkeying around such that you feel like you're gonna implode on yourself. One other team that never fails to make me feel this way is Newcastle.
Rachel was quite enthusiastic and the others were going on about it and teasing her quite a bit, but soon enough I started getting quite animated myself. Yins, Mikaela and Angie were clearly quite amused for very irrelevant reasons.
The game ended goal-less. The rain really killed things I think. The atmosphere could've been so much better. Catching the Singapore vs Lebanon qualifier match on wednesday; I'm really hoping quite badly that it'll be a great deal better than today's.
Although I've already decided on 'Is Democracy A Universal Value?' for my political science term paper, I've been struggling to simply get started on it since over a week ago. So I decided to try pretending that I was gonna blog on it like some other random pointless topic by typing it out using blogger.com, and everything just started coming out. And I'm quite damn amazed. Just like how I get mental constipation from attempting to do work in the library, using a formal program like Microsoft Word to work on my essay causes my mind to simply shut off because, well it's no surprise anyway, I hate the idea of doing work.
I have interestingly just managed to fool myself. Hmm.
This unofficial 1-week break is effectively screwing up my whole sleeping cycle. I feel as if, without the civiling influence of school and institutional order, I'm naturally revertible to being nocturnal. Can't help it; night time is preciously zen.
And so I start to forget about it and move on, just like that. And when you think about how hard it is, especially perhaps for girls to do so, it makes me wonder what kinda quantum leap it takes for us to be convinced enough to see the light and take the more enlightened path; the path that would have less pointless self-induced suffering. We're inherently wired differently.
And come to think of it, why did I even have those different states of mind? Why did it have to take such circumstances of rude awakenings and the like before I could have a change of heart? Why couldn't it be a matter of my own will to not get trapped? What kinda will power does it take? It is so fascinating. We are truly such experential creatures at the end of the day. :]
Intel has announced its next chip: the Repentium.
Audio Candy:
Stereophonics - Have A Nice Day
Wednesday, 19 March 2008
Realpolitik
Juno is a really good movie. I have a soft spot for non-mainstream, underdog stuff, and Juno really cuts it for me. Personally, it was flawless. I won't even consider its idealistic nature a problem - it declares 'idealistic' with such delicately well executed acting and plot development that Juno wouldn't be what it is otherwise.
I enjoyed the simple nature of the story. I like the messages of love, life and humanity it carries across social and class cleavages. I think the soundtrack is wicked - whenever the music came on, it was spot on for the mood in its seemingly child-like simplicity, yet not devoid of its bitingly connotative tunes and lyrics in almost mock fashion. And most of all, I absolutely delighted in the acting, sarcasm and wit of Juno and her really darn kickass parents, especially her dad. It makes me wanna unabashedly say that I think Juno is really cool and likeable.
Step Up 2 really pales in comparison with it's first installment. While I know I shouldn't be watching such dance movies for the plot, this one's was particularly bad I think. Character development was non-existent and the plot was incredibly unbelievable and painfully predictable. But nonetheless, the show still has a major feel-good factor with its dances that make me wish I could move that well too. The final scene of the dance in the rain out in the streets was dope.
For those who hate politics and the like, skip what comes next.
It is yet another very enlightening Tuesday with political science once again. We talk about stuff like the international political economy (IPE) and how it lies within the blanket of globalisation and, one level up, international security, addressing the schools of thought that concern these issues. Realism asserts that briefly, states in the world, irregardless of time, seek to preserve the survival of the state through self-help, and that war is an inevitable means or byproduct in achieving these aims. We talk about the possible necessity of bipolar order - where there was once the US and the Soviet Union forming the balance, now China is the rising dragon that is counteracting the US hegemony, once again giving weight to bipolar proponents. It is argued that violence and war are inevitable, and it is understandable how optimists readily attempt to refute this by saying that we can actually offset the need for conflict through cooperation. Yet, as we look at how, after each major war - World War I, World War II, the Cold War, we enjoy peace for no longer than a decade each time after a war is through, we can start to wonder if the need for war can ever be truly eradicated. And true enough to war-centered and pessimistic prediction, about a decade after the Cold War came 9/11 and every other violent conflict that terrorism and wars of this new age bring about. The relevance of ideology has never been more surreal as old adages find new forms through new means such as globalisation.
With Good Friday, I'm up for yet another unofficial one-week holiday. So yeh no classes, more or less, til next Tuesday, unlike every other underprivileged student in SMU.
I can't dispute that I probably needed this wake up call that was quite on the cards but just not happening soon enough. Now I guess I'm really getting somewhere myself.
I wish my lawn was emo so that it would cut itself.
Audio Candy:
Juno Reactor - Mona Lisa Overdrive
I enjoyed the simple nature of the story. I like the messages of love, life and humanity it carries across social and class cleavages. I think the soundtrack is wicked - whenever the music came on, it was spot on for the mood in its seemingly child-like simplicity, yet not devoid of its bitingly connotative tunes and lyrics in almost mock fashion. And most of all, I absolutely delighted in the acting, sarcasm and wit of Juno and her really darn kickass parents, especially her dad. It makes me wanna unabashedly say that I think Juno is really cool and likeable.
Step Up 2 really pales in comparison with it's first installment. While I know I shouldn't be watching such dance movies for the plot, this one's was particularly bad I think. Character development was non-existent and the plot was incredibly unbelievable and painfully predictable. But nonetheless, the show still has a major feel-good factor with its dances that make me wish I could move that well too. The final scene of the dance in the rain out in the streets was dope.
For those who hate politics and the like, skip what comes next.
It is yet another very enlightening Tuesday with political science once again. We talk about stuff like the international political economy (IPE) and how it lies within the blanket of globalisation and, one level up, international security, addressing the schools of thought that concern these issues. Realism asserts that briefly, states in the world, irregardless of time, seek to preserve the survival of the state through self-help, and that war is an inevitable means or byproduct in achieving these aims. We talk about the possible necessity of bipolar order - where there was once the US and the Soviet Union forming the balance, now China is the rising dragon that is counteracting the US hegemony, once again giving weight to bipolar proponents. It is argued that violence and war are inevitable, and it is understandable how optimists readily attempt to refute this by saying that we can actually offset the need for conflict through cooperation. Yet, as we look at how, after each major war - World War I, World War II, the Cold War, we enjoy peace for no longer than a decade each time after a war is through, we can start to wonder if the need for war can ever be truly eradicated. And true enough to war-centered and pessimistic prediction, about a decade after the Cold War came 9/11 and every other violent conflict that terrorism and wars of this new age bring about. The relevance of ideology has never been more surreal as old adages find new forms through new means such as globalisation.
With Good Friday, I'm up for yet another unofficial one-week holiday. So yeh no classes, more or less, til next Tuesday, unlike every other underprivileged student in SMU.
I can't dispute that I probably needed this wake up call that was quite on the cards but just not happening soon enough. Now I guess I'm really getting somewhere myself.
I wish my lawn was emo so that it would cut itself.
Audio Candy:
Juno Reactor - Mona Lisa Overdrive
Thursday, 13 March 2008
Slippery Slope
Blazed through what most other people would deem as a crazy week because of BGS and AS assignments. Actually, it doesn't really matter to me. I always consciously procrastinate to the last minute because it's the only thing that'll get me started anyway. It's not like having 3 weeks to get a piece of work done will mean I'll expand the time to do it. More often than not, an assignment just consists of one or 2 days' worth of intense work and I'm done.
What's a bitch about the De Beers article I have to analyse for BGS is that it was written in 1998 when it was still a monopolistic cartel. A decade later and it's a mere player on a level field, so I don't really know if I should write knowing that things have changed.
Yesterday, I saw a couple, and a funny train of thought got triggered. Cos I was thinking that perhaps I should be jealous, but instead of feeling jealous, I think of what other people would think or are supposed to think. So what comes to mind is perhaps jealousy. Then I wonder if the way I think is affected by what I perceive should be thought. And I'm also thinking this is funny because this train of thought is really pointless and stupid to begin with. And then I think perhaps this means that my propensity for emotions is somewhat impaired, because I think with my head ahead of feeling with my heart. Then again this isn't so bad. And then again this kinda sucks. So I guess perhaps I don't really care. But inherently, writing a senseless paragraph about this kinda means I care. So yeh I suppose I'm just going round in circles.
Max Weber says. If you wanna be a politician but you wanna make money, be a journalist. If you wanna be a politician but you wanna be morally upright, be a priest.
To get something done, a committee should consist of three men, two of whom are absent.
Audio Candy:
The Format - She Doesn't Get It
What's a bitch about the De Beers article I have to analyse for BGS is that it was written in 1998 when it was still a monopolistic cartel. A decade later and it's a mere player on a level field, so I don't really know if I should write knowing that things have changed.
Yesterday, I saw a couple, and a funny train of thought got triggered. Cos I was thinking that perhaps I should be jealous, but instead of feeling jealous, I think of what other people would think or are supposed to think. So what comes to mind is perhaps jealousy. Then I wonder if the way I think is affected by what I perceive should be thought. And I'm also thinking this is funny because this train of thought is really pointless and stupid to begin with. And then I think perhaps this means that my propensity for emotions is somewhat impaired, because I think with my head ahead of feeling with my heart. Then again this isn't so bad. And then again this kinda sucks. So I guess perhaps I don't really care. But inherently, writing a senseless paragraph about this kinda means I care. So yeh I suppose I'm just going round in circles.
Max Weber says. If you wanna be a politician but you wanna make money, be a journalist. If you wanna be a politician but you wanna be morally upright, be a priest.
To get something done, a committee should consist of three men, two of whom are absent.
Audio Candy:
The Format - She Doesn't Get It
Tuesday, 11 March 2008
Silent Hammer
Yitwen notched 11 people asking about his dressing, a ridiculously colourful cap, a small black, camou bermudas and that ugly kinda laptop bag, which he wore for 5 days as part of social experiment #1. Mikaela came closest at guessing 10 people would notice. Bahhh.
The steamboat-that-never-was day was seriously the shit. Got down to Marina Bay with Mikaela, Angie, Jacq and Yitwen and took the wrong bus - 402 - to end up at this pier place where you can take a ferry to Batam. Angie tried to ask the bus driver for directions but he avoided her like the plague which was really hilarious. I bought a curry puff there, Yitwen had to up that by buying 2 (which he had trouble finishing) and Mikaela flung one of them for whatever reason.
So we took 402 back to Marina Bay and took the correct bus this time - 400 - to finally head down to the famous steamboat place. However, after a long ride (punctuated by my really small, stupid and irrelevant epiphanies along the way), we ended up back at Marina Bay, so everyone was like wtf and Rachel went to ask the driver what happened, to which he replied that its closed already. So Rachel asked, "why you never tell us?" To which the gh3yass prick replied, "walk walk see see lah!"
wtf mannnnnnn.
Had rice with dishes instead at some hawker centre near Clarke Quay where the aunties call their lime juice "lum joo".
It's fascinating seeing how such seemingly fantastical concepts such as today's topics of realism and liberalism in political science class can be manifested in the affairs of the state and international relations such as the US war on Iraq triggered off by 9/11.
School work is catching me off guard again, and I'm surviving off the recesses of adrenaline to stay awake in class. Every monday and tuesday my sleeping cycle crashes back to a reset. Thankfully there's only a month left before some really hardcore holidays.
Independence is my gift and curse. Random. I don't quite know what to make of it, but while I feel extremely compelled to state my case, I know that at the same time, a multitude of things - that just by being who I am, I'm a biased entity; that you probably can't say for sure; that you probably don't really care; that it seriously doesn't matter anyway; that you might not have even meant it; that it could all just be a joke or test - will happen to conspire my deliberated apathy, but at the same time I guess that maybe you know it matters to me and it leaves in me a bitter aftertaste that won't go away. Like a loaded question, I stand implicitly accused without a refuting chance. Without reeking of sounding uptight and edgy. Which leaves me stuck either way - action or inaction.
I'm apprehensive about throwing down my trump cards also.
Haha. Well I suppose it really sucks saying that it doesn't affect me when my actions have spoken ahead of me in contradiction. I'll just buy myself time by tolerating the indecision. Random. Sometimes we say we're okay when we're not okay, and sometimes we say we're sorry when we're not.
Flattery looks like friendship, just like a wolf looks like a dog.
Audio Candy:
The Killers - Read Your Mind
The steamboat-that-never-was day was seriously the shit. Got down to Marina Bay with Mikaela, Angie, Jacq and Yitwen and took the wrong bus - 402 - to end up at this pier place where you can take a ferry to Batam. Angie tried to ask the bus driver for directions but he avoided her like the plague which was really hilarious. I bought a curry puff there, Yitwen had to up that by buying 2 (which he had trouble finishing) and Mikaela flung one of them for whatever reason.
So we took 402 back to Marina Bay and took the correct bus this time - 400 - to finally head down to the famous steamboat place. However, after a long ride (punctuated by my really small, stupid and irrelevant epiphanies along the way), we ended up back at Marina Bay, so everyone was like wtf and Rachel went to ask the driver what happened, to which he replied that its closed already. So Rachel asked, "why you never tell us?" To which the gh3yass prick replied, "walk walk see see lah!"
wtf mannnnnnn.
Had rice with dishes instead at some hawker centre near Clarke Quay where the aunties call their lime juice "lum joo".
It's fascinating seeing how such seemingly fantastical concepts such as today's topics of realism and liberalism in political science class can be manifested in the affairs of the state and international relations such as the US war on Iraq triggered off by 9/11.
School work is catching me off guard again, and I'm surviving off the recesses of adrenaline to stay awake in class. Every monday and tuesday my sleeping cycle crashes back to a reset. Thankfully there's only a month left before some really hardcore holidays.
Independence is my gift and curse. Random. I don't quite know what to make of it, but while I feel extremely compelled to state my case, I know that at the same time, a multitude of things - that just by being who I am, I'm a biased entity; that you probably can't say for sure; that you probably don't really care; that it seriously doesn't matter anyway; that you might not have even meant it; that it could all just be a joke or test - will happen to conspire my deliberated apathy, but at the same time I guess that maybe you know it matters to me and it leaves in me a bitter aftertaste that won't go away. Like a loaded question, I stand implicitly accused without a refuting chance. Without reeking of sounding uptight and edgy. Which leaves me stuck either way - action or inaction.
I'm apprehensive about throwing down my trump cards also.
Haha. Well I suppose it really sucks saying that it doesn't affect me when my actions have spoken ahead of me in contradiction. I'll just buy myself time by tolerating the indecision. Random. Sometimes we say we're okay when we're not okay, and sometimes we say we're sorry when we're not.
Flattery looks like friendship, just like a wolf looks like a dog.
Audio Candy:
The Killers - Read Your Mind
Thursday, 6 March 2008
Non-Sequitur
SMU is seriously teeming with St Nicks' girls. This might not even have qualified as a piece of pointless comment if not for the fact that it's one of those things you suddenly realise and it hits. I even know all about Molly Leong, Gwee Siew Hong, the singing Chinese teacher and yellow bowl. But then again that's just that so yup.
Been capitalising on the rainy weather to wear out some of my sweater-shirts that I otherwise wouldn't even conceive putting on in Singapore's generally hot and humid climate. On top of that, it can get really cold sometimes now.
Scored decently for economics with 76/100, though it could've been a lot better (within the A grade range) if I didn't forget to do 2 questions. Political science was bad at 4/10 (2 questions 2/5 each), but it's nothing I wasn't quite unexpecting.
Rahul Sagar has cut the remaining syllabus quite a bit, and we're starting to move from the basics (ideology, fundamentals of nation and state, government structure, rational choice theory etc) towards application (politics and economy, policy-making, etc), and it really feels as if I've just graduated from being a basic trainee to a policy-making student, somewhat like moving on from BMT to commander training.
I can sense some degree of aptitude within me towards macroeconomics, so perhaps the later part of political science won't be so bad if we focus more on IPE pertaining to the state and market. I found it really fascinating to know about how policies set by the communist regime of the Soviet Union, in attempting to find the perfect formula to run an economy like clockwork, gave rise to many brilliant physicists, mathematicians, economists and statisticians. And the 35hr work-week law that France has is also quite interesting to know as it reflects the idea of our close to heart spoil market sentiments in the form of formal policy.
I used to be quite captivated by the idea behind the MOE's marketing campaign for recruiting teachers. In those advertisements, the central idea of 'making lessons come to life' is represented by scenes of classrooms literally bursting into life - students so enthralled by the knowledge imparted that their calculators start to float, the classroom turns into a space port, a dinosaur looms overhead, amongst other scenes.
I've always wondered if I could do something like that. Perhaps I feel this way because I've always thought that, for the most part, none of the teachers I had ever lived up to this expectation. But I believe it's not easy, and I can't be blameless for being unappreciative when I was a naive young student anyway.
While I have my personal peeves with political science, a subject with still that degree of vagueness that I simply can't grasp well, I have to admit that I can actually safely say that no lesson has ever come to life as much as this political science intro module that I'm taking now has. For all the flak he has received, I really think that Rahul Sagar is a good professor, and his wit is just mesmerising. Never has my mind been more mentally stimulated than in political science class, and I won't ever regret the ideas, information and knowledge that I have been exposed to thus far.
Hence my love-hate relationship with political science. But it's still a clear choice for me with psychology.
Literature is a power to be possessed, not a body of objects to be studied.
Audio Candy:
Alesana - Apology
Been capitalising on the rainy weather to wear out some of my sweater-shirts that I otherwise wouldn't even conceive putting on in Singapore's generally hot and humid climate. On top of that, it can get really cold sometimes now.
Scored decently for economics with 76/100, though it could've been a lot better (within the A grade range) if I didn't forget to do 2 questions. Political science was bad at 4/10 (2 questions 2/5 each), but it's nothing I wasn't quite unexpecting.
Rahul Sagar has cut the remaining syllabus quite a bit, and we're starting to move from the basics (ideology, fundamentals of nation and state, government structure, rational choice theory etc) towards application (politics and economy, policy-making, etc), and it really feels as if I've just graduated from being a basic trainee to a policy-making student, somewhat like moving on from BMT to commander training.
I can sense some degree of aptitude within me towards macroeconomics, so perhaps the later part of political science won't be so bad if we focus more on IPE pertaining to the state and market. I found it really fascinating to know about how policies set by the communist regime of the Soviet Union, in attempting to find the perfect formula to run an economy like clockwork, gave rise to many brilliant physicists, mathematicians, economists and statisticians. And the 35hr work-week law that France has is also quite interesting to know as it reflects the idea of our close to heart spoil market sentiments in the form of formal policy.
I used to be quite captivated by the idea behind the MOE's marketing campaign for recruiting teachers. In those advertisements, the central idea of 'making lessons come to life' is represented by scenes of classrooms literally bursting into life - students so enthralled by the knowledge imparted that their calculators start to float, the classroom turns into a space port, a dinosaur looms overhead, amongst other scenes.
I've always wondered if I could do something like that. Perhaps I feel this way because I've always thought that, for the most part, none of the teachers I had ever lived up to this expectation. But I believe it's not easy, and I can't be blameless for being unappreciative when I was a naive young student anyway.
While I have my personal peeves with political science, a subject with still that degree of vagueness that I simply can't grasp well, I have to admit that I can actually safely say that no lesson has ever come to life as much as this political science intro module that I'm taking now has. For all the flak he has received, I really think that Rahul Sagar is a good professor, and his wit is just mesmerising. Never has my mind been more mentally stimulated than in political science class, and I won't ever regret the ideas, information and knowledge that I have been exposed to thus far.
Hence my love-hate relationship with political science. But it's still a clear choice for me with psychology.
Literature is a power to be possessed, not a body of objects to be studied.
Audio Candy:
Alesana - Apology
Wednesday, 20 February 2008
Turnaround
And in a flash, my midterms are over and I won't have pesky CT classes on monday afternoons to contend with anymore. It's somewhat surreal to know that from week 8 onwards, I'll be virtually having a 2-day week.
I don't really know what I was thinking cos I handed in my econs paper with 2 questions left out. In fact, I left out 3; while on my way towards wherever, I realised there was a question I forgot to answer and practically ran back to class to request for a last minute fill in. Prof said it was okay I guess because it was just a yes or no opinion (will the US suffer a recession?). Then on my way out again I realised there were actually 2 more. Pah.
CT turned out pretty alright I guess. Political science was totally by the book, no surprises; not much I'd wanna elaborate on them, but the political science questions may pose some real good food for thought:
1) How persuasive are the arguments for a proportionally representative government?
2) "Nations are imagined communities." Should this worry us?
3) Is democracy a universal value?
4) Norms are the foundations of a healthy representative government. Agree?
Been labelled a chao mugger over the past few days. The weekend seriously didn't feel like a weekend. Matter of fact, come to think of it, I don't really recall much since the last post on Valentine's day, so I can only hope the grades for once reflect the effort I guess. Hope dangles on a string, so I suppose I'm not too bothered with that. There's so much more to look forward to once the papers are over anyway.
There's a futsal tournament at NUS next monday, and Waikiki next saturday. Barbara's roping me into her Bossaball team, whatever that really is, and I'm hoping to bring a team down for beach soccer. So yeah still gotta head down to school to do registration saikang stuff.
Newspapers are so much easier to read now that I'm empowered with some basic understanding of economics.
1 tonne weights are pulling on my eyelids. So long and good night.
A wedding ring is sort of a tourniquet worn on one's finger to stop circulation.
Today's Listenables:
Something Corporate - She Paints Me Blue
I don't really know what I was thinking cos I handed in my econs paper with 2 questions left out. In fact, I left out 3; while on my way towards wherever, I realised there was a question I forgot to answer and practically ran back to class to request for a last minute fill in. Prof said it was okay I guess because it was just a yes or no opinion (will the US suffer a recession?). Then on my way out again I realised there were actually 2 more. Pah.
CT turned out pretty alright I guess. Political science was totally by the book, no surprises; not much I'd wanna elaborate on them, but the political science questions may pose some real good food for thought:
1) How persuasive are the arguments for a proportionally representative government?
2) "Nations are imagined communities." Should this worry us?
3) Is democracy a universal value?
4) Norms are the foundations of a healthy representative government. Agree?
Been labelled a chao mugger over the past few days. The weekend seriously didn't feel like a weekend. Matter of fact, come to think of it, I don't really recall much since the last post on Valentine's day, so I can only hope the grades for once reflect the effort I guess. Hope dangles on a string, so I suppose I'm not too bothered with that. There's so much more to look forward to once the papers are over anyway.
There's a futsal tournament at NUS next monday, and Waikiki next saturday. Barbara's roping me into her Bossaball team, whatever that really is, and I'm hoping to bring a team down for beach soccer. So yeah still gotta head down to school to do registration saikang stuff.
Newspapers are so much easier to read now that I'm empowered with some basic understanding of economics.
1 tonne weights are pulling on my eyelids. So long and good night.
A wedding ring is sort of a tourniquet worn on one's finger to stop circulation.
Today's Listenables:
Something Corporate - She Paints Me Blue
Wednesday, 6 February 2008
Blah, Seriously
The efforts of last week's prep for today's political science presentation totally went down the drain. I guess Rahul Sagar was just being particularly utilitarian (in the literal sense, not the ideology you pol science freaks) with regards to this presentation thing. In a sense he wanted this presentation to be a means of the group 'teaching' the class and then raising the topic of debate which he will then address, and he will sum things up after.
But perhaps time has been a constraint, so he decided to open things up by lecturing a little first, then letting us present. The problem was that he touched on so many things that we were gonna present on and eventually perhaps got somewhat impatient that we were reiterating what he had said and told us to skip parts of the presentation. I think we skipped about 3/4 of what we were gonna present.
So our presentation just looked really terrible.
I'm not that bothered pertaining to the grades although I know the possibility of this being a flunked presentation; I'm just feeling really blah in an extremely unfulfilled way that we really had a lot to offer but couldn't because of something we weren't fairly prepared for. And it kinda sucks to know that Angie and Benita, who both wanna major in political science and thus would take huge pride in this for, might potentially have their grades compromised due to this really ridiculous misadventure.
And the efforts man. Also, I liked this chapter alot because for once it wasn't so much about stuff like parliamentary systems, but rather about rationality which is really within my philosophical capacity to deal with.
On the bright side of things, I can take a breather of sorts now that a major project from an absolutely gargantuan module has been done with.
Anyway, this is really a personal opinion but I think sociology with a little more effort put into it would simply be political science. Sociology is such a half-assed subject to me that it's just like political science without the conviction of coming to some conclusive ends.
Chinese New Year's comin' and usually my family would have a personal reunion dinner together the day before CNY eve. It's been quite awhile since I last had dinner at home, or even a meal for that matter, and I missed dinner today though I could've easily just have went home early. I came home to a really huge spread that had gone cold on the table so I felt bad and that kinda sucked on hindsight.
Sucks that the laptop will be back only after CNY too, and all the doubled homework from not having any lessons for the rest of the week.
Actually one of the reasons, or perhaps the fundamental reason that led on to other things, of why I ended up going home late today was because a smart-assed me went to raise the philosophical morality question about God to Benita after class, and we (including Isaac and Angie) ended up talking about it for a solid hour after everyone else had deserted the classroom. It led me to revisit my own beliefs which I haven't talked about for quite some time, and they are beliefs I used to talk about with much fervour before I mellowed down, for whatever reasons (the understanding that nothing can be conclusive anyway, or just simply realising that I can be too imposing perhaps). But I think it might be quite useful for me to formally address this so that I can solidify what I think, rather than being really g4y and telling people that what I believe in entails a long story and procrastinate only to say it in the end in a really half-assed manner 'cos I cannot grasp my rusty train of thought. So yeah, I'm dedicating a post to that.
After you've heard two eyewitness accounts of an automobile accident, you begin to worry about history.
Today's Listenables:
I Am Ghost - We Are Always Searching
But perhaps time has been a constraint, so he decided to open things up by lecturing a little first, then letting us present. The problem was that he touched on so many things that we were gonna present on and eventually perhaps got somewhat impatient that we were reiterating what he had said and told us to skip parts of the presentation. I think we skipped about 3/4 of what we were gonna present.
So our presentation just looked really terrible.
I'm not that bothered pertaining to the grades although I know the possibility of this being a flunked presentation; I'm just feeling really blah in an extremely unfulfilled way that we really had a lot to offer but couldn't because of something we weren't fairly prepared for. And it kinda sucks to know that Angie and Benita, who both wanna major in political science and thus would take huge pride in this for, might potentially have their grades compromised due to this really ridiculous misadventure.
And the efforts man. Also, I liked this chapter alot because for once it wasn't so much about stuff like parliamentary systems, but rather about rationality which is really within my philosophical capacity to deal with.
On the bright side of things, I can take a breather of sorts now that a major project from an absolutely gargantuan module has been done with.
Anyway, this is really a personal opinion but I think sociology with a little more effort put into it would simply be political science. Sociology is such a half-assed subject to me that it's just like political science without the conviction of coming to some conclusive ends.
Chinese New Year's comin' and usually my family would have a personal reunion dinner together the day before CNY eve. It's been quite awhile since I last had dinner at home, or even a meal for that matter, and I missed dinner today though I could've easily just have went home early. I came home to a really huge spread that had gone cold on the table so I felt bad and that kinda sucked on hindsight.
Sucks that the laptop will be back only after CNY too, and all the doubled homework from not having any lessons for the rest of the week.
Actually one of the reasons, or perhaps the fundamental reason that led on to other things, of why I ended up going home late today was because a smart-assed me went to raise the philosophical morality question about God to Benita after class, and we (including Isaac and Angie) ended up talking about it for a solid hour after everyone else had deserted the classroom. It led me to revisit my own beliefs which I haven't talked about for quite some time, and they are beliefs I used to talk about with much fervour before I mellowed down, for whatever reasons (the understanding that nothing can be conclusive anyway, or just simply realising that I can be too imposing perhaps). But I think it might be quite useful for me to formally address this so that I can solidify what I think, rather than being really g4y and telling people that what I believe in entails a long story and procrastinate only to say it in the end in a really half-assed manner 'cos I cannot grasp my rusty train of thought. So yeah, I'm dedicating a post to that.
After you've heard two eyewitness accounts of an automobile accident, you begin to worry about history.
Today's Listenables:
I Am Ghost - We Are Always Searching
Sunday, 3 February 2008
Late Night, Come Home; Work Sucks, I Know
Politikal Sai-yence all the way til 4am just.
I must, however, say that political science is at once alluring in wit as it is extremely intellectual. Admittedly, all that reading has trained my comprehension to reach a certain unprecedented level thus far, rendering BGS and econs stuff pertaining to those such as globalisation, supply and demand and investments pretty much jiao wei. I will definitely hold a political science major student in a different, probably more esteemed light from now on, because it is seriously a very intellectual subject to study and it really takes some character to meet those challenges posed by the sciences of policy-making.
Our last meeting for our presentation next week opened up a debate that eventually based itself on philosophical grounds. In a discussion of rational choice theory, as always the definitions of what is truly rational becomes a bottomline for contest, as we attack away the subjective aspects of the issue and deadlock at what's left. We were then relegated to 2 distinct schools of thought: can EVERYTHING eventually fall under the broad umbrella of rational choice? Or is there another set of forces that govern what we do without us knowing, and thus rendering our actions independent of making rational choices altogether? In typical circular argument fashion, we couldn't decide whether or not the perceived independent part, described by Clifford Geertz as symbolic interactionism, is a stand-alone and is permanently independent from making rational choices, or if it is eventually still a part of rational choice in eventuality.
Heavy duty thoughts aside, I've been playing Tower Bloxx on Facebook, the next thing since Scrabulous that I ever really used Facebook in frivolous fashion for (aside from the more practical aspects of storing photos and keeping in touch with friends in a really trivial manner), and now everyone's on it. I've watched the leaderboard grow from like 4 people to more than 10 now and, while I'm tops with 111 blocks, the scores are steadily rising and gaining ground too! Feelin' the heat man.
In totally random and pointless fashion, at times I think nothing beats instant gratification in a simple sense. When I'm hungry, I would love to have my food immediately, because once that hunger is gone, the food wouldn't taste as good as it might. When a lecturer's drawl starts to induce sleep, I would LOVE to be able to sleep. I really think that's one of the best ways to sleep so much so that I think such therapy of allowing people to attend some kinda workshop just to let them sleep by engaging a really lousy speaker would be fantastic. And that's also why I don't like watching Just For Laughs sometimes on TVMobile (aside from the fact that I'm motion-sickness prone). I can't really laugh out loud, and I always enjoy a good guffaw.
I must, however, say that political science is at once alluring in wit as it is extremely intellectual. Admittedly, all that reading has trained my comprehension to reach a certain unprecedented level thus far, rendering BGS and econs stuff pertaining to those such as globalisation, supply and demand and investments pretty much jiao wei. I will definitely hold a political science major student in a different, probably more esteemed light from now on, because it is seriously a very intellectual subject to study and it really takes some character to meet those challenges posed by the sciences of policy-making.
Our last meeting for our presentation next week opened up a debate that eventually based itself on philosophical grounds. In a discussion of rational choice theory, as always the definitions of what is truly rational becomes a bottomline for contest, as we attack away the subjective aspects of the issue and deadlock at what's left. We were then relegated to 2 distinct schools of thought: can EVERYTHING eventually fall under the broad umbrella of rational choice? Or is there another set of forces that govern what we do without us knowing, and thus rendering our actions independent of making rational choices altogether? In typical circular argument fashion, we couldn't decide whether or not the perceived independent part, described by Clifford Geertz as symbolic interactionism, is a stand-alone and is permanently independent from making rational choices, or if it is eventually still a part of rational choice in eventuality.
Heavy duty thoughts aside, I've been playing Tower Bloxx on Facebook, the next thing since Scrabulous that I ever really used Facebook in frivolous fashion for (aside from the more practical aspects of storing photos and keeping in touch with friends in a really trivial manner), and now everyone's on it. I've watched the leaderboard grow from like 4 people to more than 10 now and, while I'm tops with 111 blocks, the scores are steadily rising and gaining ground too! Feelin' the heat man.
In totally random and pointless fashion, at times I think nothing beats instant gratification in a simple sense. When I'm hungry, I would love to have my food immediately, because once that hunger is gone, the food wouldn't taste as good as it might. When a lecturer's drawl starts to induce sleep, I would LOVE to be able to sleep. I really think that's one of the best ways to sleep so much so that I think such therapy of allowing people to attend some kinda workshop just to let them sleep by engaging a really lousy speaker would be fantastic. And that's also why I don't like watching Just For Laughs sometimes on TVMobile (aside from the fact that I'm motion-sickness prone). I can't really laugh out loud, and I always enjoy a good guffaw.
Thursday, 31 January 2008
Economies Of Scale
I got my laptop back on Monday only for it to crash again, so I had to send it back to Edwin for another fix. I have no idea what's wrong with it and it's been a real pain to deal with of late, especially when it's an additional burden (both of having to deal with, and of not having a laptop to do work with) amongst other things I have to worry about.
So I'm using my dad's laptop that functions at frikkin' jet fighter speed but it's okay 'cos I really miss being connected to the world from my bed.
Actually, I guess political science seriously takes the cake out of the 'amongst other things' I'm talking about. I'm doing this unofficial jigsaw group thing with Isaac and Angie and others who wanna join and I really hate it because I'm at best a responsible bummer and at worst a vitriolic apathetic. Personally, when I'm not interested, I'm really just not interested and nothing can get me going on it. So when I've read pol science readings to the point where I seriously don't wanna continue, I'd just really forget it and not bother to read.
But in this jigsaw group thing, I can't do that! And it really pisses me off to know that I can't just stop reading when I don't feel like it already because I'm responsible for someone else's knowledge. So far I've had 2 sessions already and each session just kills me. I will be doing this for another week because it's my presentation next week. I'm truly at my production possibilities frontier, after which I guess I'll just allow myself to get into a recession, 'cos honestly I really can't be more bothered about it. I think this is really starting to remind me of the time I decided to unofficially drop social studies in secondary school. Yes I know, "huh can drop meh?" You can't. So I just basically stopped paying attention, stopped studying and after awhile stopped attending classes. Literature saved my humanities component of the 'O' levels.
Anyway I was at NUS on saturday to supposedly catch Sab in action for the inter-hall soccer games but she sprained her ankle last minute and so couldn't be fielded. I had the privilege of watching 2 matches, though she thinks it was embarassing to have me come all the way down to see them lose. Then she was telling me about a life of mediocrity later, but there's a somewhat abstract relation to all this with some other thoughts I had.
I've never really had any real success at soccer myself, though I'd consider myself a 'got pedigree' player, aside from the little juggling competitions I win every now and then but that's really peanuts. There's always a time when you're young and only 15 years old and running circles around the older guys, being the one to look out for. Time passes, and now I'm the older guy. Though I don't let 15 year-old kids run circles around me, there isn't really much in it for me anymore and university will pass without me partaking in any varsity soccer games, arguably the last chance at playing soccer institutionally and meaningfully. I'm still playing competitive street soccer games every now and then, and weekends are still spent at the neighbourhood street soccer courts kickassing, but for how long more? We used to scoff at the oldies who'd hog the court but soon it'll be my turn to start seeing kids 5 years younger than me jump in and takeover.
And this is Sab's last IHG also, so I decided that there's no harm having a look. It's interesting watching girls play soccer anyway. Emo stuff aside, I didn't go there to watch it for the glamour of winning; it was indeed quite warming to see the universalities of emotions pertaining to the sport, and they say that the emotional aspects of the ladies' game can be much higher.
I think there's a lot more I'd probably wanna say but I'm not half done with the stuff I have to prep for tomorrow's pol science meeting and it's bloody 1am already. Anyhooser, I'm gonna put up a post from the past with each new entry I post so yeah y'all can look out for that one. Some of the stuff written's quite g4y but it's for archiving and nostalgia's sake.
So I'm using my dad's laptop that functions at frikkin' jet fighter speed but it's okay 'cos I really miss being connected to the world from my bed.
Actually, I guess political science seriously takes the cake out of the 'amongst other things' I'm talking about. I'm doing this unofficial jigsaw group thing with Isaac and Angie and others who wanna join and I really hate it because I'm at best a responsible bummer and at worst a vitriolic apathetic. Personally, when I'm not interested, I'm really just not interested and nothing can get me going on it. So when I've read pol science readings to the point where I seriously don't wanna continue, I'd just really forget it and not bother to read.
But in this jigsaw group thing, I can't do that! And it really pisses me off to know that I can't just stop reading when I don't feel like it already because I'm responsible for someone else's knowledge. So far I've had 2 sessions already and each session just kills me. I will be doing this for another week because it's my presentation next week. I'm truly at my production possibilities frontier, after which I guess I'll just allow myself to get into a recession, 'cos honestly I really can't be more bothered about it. I think this is really starting to remind me of the time I decided to unofficially drop social studies in secondary school. Yes I know, "huh can drop meh?" You can't. So I just basically stopped paying attention, stopped studying and after awhile stopped attending classes. Literature saved my humanities component of the 'O' levels.
Anyway I was at NUS on saturday to supposedly catch Sab in action for the inter-hall soccer games but she sprained her ankle last minute and so couldn't be fielded. I had the privilege of watching 2 matches, though she thinks it was embarassing to have me come all the way down to see them lose. Then she was telling me about a life of mediocrity later, but there's a somewhat abstract relation to all this with some other thoughts I had.
I've never really had any real success at soccer myself, though I'd consider myself a 'got pedigree' player, aside from the little juggling competitions I win every now and then but that's really peanuts. There's always a time when you're young and only 15 years old and running circles around the older guys, being the one to look out for. Time passes, and now I'm the older guy. Though I don't let 15 year-old kids run circles around me, there isn't really much in it for me anymore and university will pass without me partaking in any varsity soccer games, arguably the last chance at playing soccer institutionally and meaningfully. I'm still playing competitive street soccer games every now and then, and weekends are still spent at the neighbourhood street soccer courts kickassing, but for how long more? We used to scoff at the oldies who'd hog the court but soon it'll be my turn to start seeing kids 5 years younger than me jump in and takeover.
And this is Sab's last IHG also, so I decided that there's no harm having a look. It's interesting watching girls play soccer anyway. Emo stuff aside, I didn't go there to watch it for the glamour of winning; it was indeed quite warming to see the universalities of emotions pertaining to the sport, and they say that the emotional aspects of the ladies' game can be much higher.
I think there's a lot more I'd probably wanna say but I'm not half done with the stuff I have to prep for tomorrow's pol science meeting and it's bloody 1am already. Anyhooser, I'm gonna put up a post from the past with each new entry I post so yeah y'all can look out for that one. Some of the stuff written's quite g4y but it's for archiving and nostalgia's sake.
Thursday, 16 January 1986
What has Been the Impact of Economic Globalization on the Welfare State? What are the Prospects for the Welfare State? (2009)
POSC 106 - International Political Economy
Introduction
With the advent of economic globalization in our contemporary world, questions have been asked about the predicament of the welfare state in the face of increasing free market-orientation. Three viewpoints can be readily and broadly identified. Pessimistic outlooks for the welfare state describe it as being in crisis (Mishra, 1984), under threat (Lowe, 1999a), retrenched (Mishra, 1990) or even dismantled (Community Development Project, 1977). Yet, in direct opposition to such pessimism, there are arguments that the welfare state remains as resilient or robust as ever (Le Grand, 1991) and there is still much hope yet for worldwide welfare (Greve, 2006). Still, there are considerations made to access the reality in more neutral terms that attempt to capture the durability of the traditional welfare state, while at the same time not discounting the inevitable changes that modern economic globalization brings about. The welfare states in such a perspective have been thought to be in transition (Johnson, 1987; Esping-Andersen, 1996), refashioned (Wicks, 1987), reshaped (Johnson, 1990), restructured (Sullivan, 1996; Wilding, 1992), reconstructed (Johnson, 1990), and recalibrated (Ferrera, Hemerijck & Rhodes, 2001).
Welfare statism, whose policies is considered socialist and of a state-controlled and redistributive nature, is considered to be opposed to economic globalization which is popularly regarded as the propagation of free markets and liberalization. Economic globalization has been defined as the expansion of international trade in goods and services, increasing international flow of capital, internationalization of production through transnational corporations and global commodity chains, growing significance and role of supra-state organizations, and increased propagation of liberal virtues and economic ideas (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005). Further, the definition of economic globalization can be refined for the purposes of this paper to include greater interconnectedness, greater emphasis on efficiency and a generally increasing transference of the responsibility of provisions from state to corporation. These traits of economic globalization give rise to the popular sentiment that the welfare state is losing its power of control and autonomy over public expenditure to the distributive determination of the free market.
What truly then constitutes an accurate portrayal of the predicament of the welfare state in these trying times of economic globalization? What has changed across the world with regards to welfare, and do all changes occur at the same rate? If there are indeed changes abound, what then is the significance of these differentials and what mitigates the impact brought on by economic globalization which lead to these different rates of change? What, indeed if any, are the prospects for the welfare state?
Habermas (2001b) describes the dilemma that national governments face today as being derived from the zero-sum game which dictates that optimal economic goals can be reached only at the expense of social and political objectives. Welfare restructuring has been a universal phenomenon particularly over the last twenty years (Stephens, 2005). Bonoli and colleagues (2000) define four main factors of economic globalization that pressure the ‘retrenchment’ of the welfare state. First, globalization imposes inescapable competition on states, constraining the autonomy of national policies particularly towards taxation and labour. Secondly, there is a decreasing tolerance for taxation to fund welfare interests. As international markets expand, taxes have to be reduced in order to compete internationally for foreign investment and prevent capital flight. Thirdly, states are increasingly adopting a neo-liberal stance in policy-making. Lastly, there is a ‘squaring of the welfare circle’, referring to the simultaneous and contradictory pressures from opposite directions experienced by governments. Higher spending is demanded to counter the rises in ageing population, demand for education and training, unemployment, and expectations that social progress involves higher standards of service. Yet concurrently, contraction of state provision is called for in view of the concern about the impact of globalization, the logic of liberalism and fears of tax revolt.
In the light of economic globalization, economic power has steadily become the new currency for political power. This is echoed by Habermas (2001b) as he states that “power can be democratized; money cannot” and that “money replaces power” in the new economic world order, which has also outlawed war, colonialism and coercion (Ikenberry, 2008). But is this really happening and, if so, to what extent? To access the impact and its extent of economic globalization, this paper will turn to a regional analysis of the alleged decline of the welfare state in Europe and Asia. This will be carried out by looking at general markers of social and welfare orientation in states such as employment, poverty and inequality levels, social benefits and levels of freedom of movement of states in policy-making, such as taxation and social security provision.
Decline of European Welfare
European welfare states have been described as the most well-developed and extensive (Sapir, 2005), where many countries enjoyed full employment during the golden era of the post-war Keynesian welfare state. In spite of this, there is an increasing general consensus that a great degree of social legislation introduced in recent years has subordinated welfare to primary neoliberal interests (Bonoli et al., 2000). With Sweden as a case in point, the increase in unemployment from 2% in the late 1980s to 9.5% in 1993 is the most obvious implication of the impact of economic globalization (Stephens, 1996), and this was echoed in other Nordic countries. Sweden had to utilize an austerity package and other crisis measures in order to combat an economic crisis in 1990, leading to reductions in social benefits (Olsson & McMurphy, 1993; Stephens, 1996). This trend of austerity has been found in the rest of Europe as well, in what Pierson (2001) terms the ‘politics of austerity’. Unemployment has since stayed at a historical high of around 8% which signalled a ‘paradigm shift’ away from trying to restore full employment. Freer movement of money and capital has inevitably resulted in greater integration of the Swedish economy in the global market place (Mishra, 1999), resulting in a diminished ability of the state to exercise political power over the citizenry, let alone redistribute in favour of welfare. Real interest rates increased from 1.4% in the 1960s to 5.6% in the early 1990s (OECD, 1995), which was caused by the elimination of controls of international and domestic financial markets. Interest rates then became more susceptible to determination by the market rather than governments. International competition pressured prices and taxes to be kept lower, compromising the post-war social contract whereby the state and tax payers fed welfare (Cox, 1987). An ideological shift, particularly in Britain, was called for towards the neoliberal consensus as Margaret Thatcher imposed radical reforms in favour of capital over labour. From this, another feature of European states emerging, altered, from a strongly welfare structure is the shifting of the burden of uncertainty from the government to the individual. Studies have found that social security and risk-protection has declined as dependence on the market increases (Bonoli et al., 2000). At any rate, the golden era of the post-war Keynesian welfare state in Europe is no longer relevant in today’s global context marked by economic globalization (Kwiek, 2007).
Decline of Asian Welfare
The forecast for the welfare state in Asia appears equally, if not more, bleak. In Asia and other developing nations, state-citizenry relations have been largely paternalistic until recent global economic development which saw them opening up to trade. Trade has often led to a significant undermining of the state’s sovereignty and ability to ensure public social security. As is observed, many corporations from the economic core have entered developing Asian countries to capitalize on lower costs and have thus dictated the lives of many underprivileged according to the forces of the market. The focus on comparative advantages has also led some Asian countries with inexpensive labour and cheap natural resources to a ‘race to the bottom’ which leaves them exposed to exploitation (Rudra, 2008).
As China and India continue to pursue greater integration with the world economy, other Asian countries are facing increased competition for markets, foreign capital and labour. In the attempt to gain opportunities in participating in the growth of China and India, social policies have been compromised (Asher & Nandy, 2006). Poverty has increased from the declining ability of the state in providing welfare particularly to rural areas as well as in cushioning the increasing prices of necessities, such as food. For example, in Vietnam where poverty has risen, over 20% of the rural population cannot meet their daily nutritional requirements even if they were to spend all of their income on basic food supplies (Chandrasiri & de Silva, 1996). In the case of South Korea, economic globalization led to a social contract crisis, as strong economic growth was not complemented with necessary socio-political development. The lack of proper institutional resources to counter the impact of economic globalization led to rising unemployment in South Korea from 2.5% before the 1997 Asian financial crisis to 9% between 1998 to 1999, and poverty rose by four-to-fivefold (Harris, 2002). The greatest beneficiaries of economic globalization – China and India – are also not spared from the negative welfare consequences of their rush to develop economically, as rising poverty and inequality plague particularly the lives of non-elites (Sahoo, 2007).
The Impact of Economic Globalization on Europe and Asia: The Verdict
An objective analysis of the general trend of Asia and Europe would definitely point to the undermining of the capacity of the state to provide for welfare by economic globalization. In both regions, capital interconnectedness has led to market dependence that is shaped by all who participate in it, such that the degree of freedom of one state to make decisions for itself is diminished as the effects of its policy-making is pegged to outcomes elsewhere. Likewise, a crisis in one part of the world has the ability to affect the stability of states in another area of the globe (Krugman, 2008). The decreasing ability of states to exercise traditional sovereignty in taxation and the waging of war, increasing unemployment, subordination of social benefits to economic gains and rising inequality have surfaced along with economic globalization. Advocates of the decline of the welfare state will see the absolute reduction in state power to provide welfare as evidence that the welfare state is in crisis.
Rebuttal Against the Decline of Welfare
In spite of the evidence highlighting the attack of economic globalization on welfare states and welfare provision around the world, a body of literature exists that argues against the demise of the welfare state. Mature welfare states in the world, particularly exemplified by northwestern Europe, have been found to be robustly durable against social erosion brought about by globalization thus far (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005). A large part of their GDP has gone towards public funding. An analysis of this, as will be discussed later, indicates that when there are newly-created social security issues that cannot be countered by traditional forms of direct intervention, strong states have the capacity to and will attempt to channel resources elsewhere to ‘make up’ for it. A host of reasons motivate this, but the general direction that states choose to implement these policies is still oriented in the way of social protection. These findings are also bolstered by assessing the reaction of South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines towards both economic globalization and the 1997 international financial crisis. In all countries, the global and economic repercussions only served to re-ignite interest in social policy as an important aspect of state policy in order to counter the risks and uncertainties brought about by economic globalization. There is also more awareness of the growing domestic demands for social policies, including population ageing, shifts towards more technologically-based economies and urbanization (Gough, 2001).
On the whole, although welfare state restructuring has led to some blurring of regime styles, there are no clear indicators of any complete overhaul of the boundaries that have defined welfare state models of these mature welfare states in the post-war period. This applies particularly to modes of financing, personal coverage and benefit provision. Some quantitative changes have occurred, but all countries qualitatively still exhibit strong similarities to the welfare state make-up inherited from the past (Obinger, Starke & Moser, 2009). These rejections of the idea that the welfare state is in decline also propose that the prospects for the welfare state, regardless of economic globalization, are still as promising as ever.
Mitigation of Anti-Welfare: What Accounts for it?
It must be noted that, historically, trade dependency and perceived economic vulnerability in the open economy of Europe enhanced the domestic power of labour and produced a strongly ingrained ideology of social partnership, leading to the formation of institutionally comprehensive welfare states that served as a security blanket against the vicissitudes of world markets (Cameron, 1978). Immunity against the harmful effects of globalization for these mature welfare states is thus constituted by their strong and prolonged historical integration into the world market, successful fiscal and international trade policy-making, a sustainable domestic balance of power between unions and government, a strong ‘naturalization’ of welfare generosity where social benefits are popular and difficult to eradicate, the ability to adapt and evolve to remain globally relevant, and economic and political stability both domestically and internationally which negates the need for dependence on international organizations (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005).
In many cases, the highly productive economies of these mature welfare states are supported by their socially-oriented policies, and the institutional structures of such mature welfare states are also deeply embedded and have been found to persist even in the face of unpopularity. Additionally, social policy in once strongly welfare states that have evolved into advanced capitalist societies can operate through state intervention to compensate for the inadequate welfare outcomes of the labour market (Gough & Wood, 2004). In so doing, these advanced capitalist societies have retained the very feature of their original strong welfare orientations. The generous welfare states of northwestern Europe were built in open economies around the interests of exposed sector employers and workers. Therefore, social policy was not only compatible with export competition but also contributed to competitiveness by enabling wage restraint and providing collective goods valued by employers, such as labour training (Huber & Stephens, 2005). Welfare state resilience in spite of economic integration even suggests that the effects of economic globalization may not be all that detrimental to welfare states, directly challenging the presently mainstream view echoed by Habermas (2001) that welfare is opposed to economic globalization. Trade is a source of economic growth which may generate fiscal resources necessary for welfare states to remain (Obinger, Starke & Moser, 2009).
In the case of northwestern Europe, while social benefits have not been significantly cut, taxation has been increased against the odds of global market pressure to make pension schemes still viable, clearly indicating the ideological durability of civil society towards welfare and the stubbornness of the social contract in major parts of Europe. In an assessment of welfare transformation in small open economies, welfare dismantling, notably in unemployment cash benefits, was strongly compensated for by expansion in other welfare aspects such as family policy or long-term care (Obinger, Starke & Moser, 2009). Even if economic globalization constrained social expenditure in states, some of these pension and wage modifications merely resulted in a modestly declining rate of welfare expenditure at most, but did little to turn around the fact that welfare expenditure still remained high and formed the primary proportion of state budgets. While there was a decline in welfare state expansion and an increase in private sector growth, public social service employment remained strong especially when contrasted to the increased unemployment that the private sector in most countries face now. Bureaucratic constraints also continued to work against radical departures from established welfare state models (Pierson, 1996).
On the other hand, however, the tendency for welfare and social provisions to be diminished by economic globalization has been found to be more prevalent in poorer developing countries (Garrett & Nickerson, 2005). Many lower and middle-income countries face balance-of-payments problems due to imperfect integration into the world economy which often leaves them vulnerable to intervention by international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. From such a perspective, conditions enforced by external entities thus compromise more strongly on the automony of these countries and, likewise, their public is subjected to pressures and harms brought about by economic globalization without the social safety nets that developed states can provide. Developing countries also compete based on the comparative advantage of cheap labour, which places them in a locked-in position where their social security is often undermined by corporate interests (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005). Here, the negative impact of economic globalization as documented in the earlier section where the ‘race to the bottom’ was referred to becomes more evident. Some states, such as India, have compromised on food self-sufficiency by struggling to gain competitive advantages in niches that serve the only interests of affluent purchasers, leading to food insecurity (Sharma, 2000). While developed states can retain their welfare regimes to bolster the effects of economic globalization and even use social policy to reap further gains from the market, such welfare regimes cannot easily be produced in poorer regions of the world where states suffer problems of governance and labour markets are imperfect and partial (Gough & Wood, 2004).
A state’s level of democratization also creates another dimension along which the effects of economic globalization on welfare either become more pronounced or diluted. Democratization was found to significantly mediate the expected decrease in government spending dynamics due to economic globalization. In countries that became more democratic between the 1980s to the 1990s, increasing market integration was associated with much faster growth in state spending, but the opposite was true in countries that did not democratize (Garrett & Nickerson, 2005). This phenomenon is accounted for by the democratizing state’s increasing ability to adapt and evolve to remain globally relevant. The political stability of democracies breeds stronger governments with better policy-making abilities, allowing these democratized states to grow economically and indulge in greater public spending (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005). Welfare groups also gain political strength through democratic regimes where values of liberty and freedom are espoused. With greater communication channels between various civil society groups and international bodies created by economic globalization, different welfare and social groups have a greater voice in protesting against various features of globalization (Graham, 2002). Here, the same tools of international communication that facilitate economic globalization are used in opposition to the social insecurities economic globalization brings about. The multitude of issues and agendas – both domestic as well as global – that came together in opposition to the World Trade Organization in Seattle as an example, illustrate the diversity of sources of opposition to globalizing strategies of capital and states, particularly to those strategies which ignore health, social and environment protection (Yeates, 2001). Democratization positively correlates with states’ level of development, which further strengthens the view that development is a mitigating factor for the impact of economic globalization on welfare.
A General Framework of Welfare State Vulnerability
With a clear distinction identified between developed and developing countries in terms of welfare state vulnerability, a more concise framework that captures the impact of economic globalization can hence be formulated.
First, whether states react well to globalization is structured by their status within the global political economy. Second, states’ room for manoeuvre in pursuing and implementing globalizing strategies is mediated by national social, demographic, cultural and economic trends, institutions and traditions. Third, states’ margin of operation is determined by the balance of political power between the state, labour, capital and civil society. Put simply, there are strong differences between what different states can ‘get away with’ and developing states simply flounder on every aspect. Despite the supposed overarching power of globalization, the national balance of political power may be decisive in respect of how far national states can accommodate globalization (Yeates, 2001). The tendency for the welfare of developing states to be detrimentally affected by economic globalization therefore exists, as they lack the sound political, industrial and social infrastructures to weather the storm.
Democratization and economic globalization, taken together, also promote the growth of public spending rather than prevent it. Democratic welfare policies strengthen democratic citizenship by giving material and organizational support to subordinate groups and by reducing differences in social status and social power (Rueschemeyer, 2001). Thus, social welfare decreased accordingly when countries globalized and integrated in the world market economy but did not democratize (Adsera & Boix, 2001).
Conclusion
Economic globalization has undeniably led to restructuring of the welfare state. However, whether such restructuring can be seen as a decline in the welfare state – as undermining the strength of the state’s ability for welfare provision – is doubtful. Some countries have displayed remarkable resolve in curtailing the effects of economic globalization by channelling more resources towards maintaining welfare provisions, even if the state’s autonomy is diminished. The state merely has to demonstrate an attempt to curtail the effects of economic globalization to still remain relevant as ‘socially-oriented’.
However, not all countries have displayed the same capacity to deal with economic globalization and provide alternative forms of welfare support in the face of increased market dependence, uncertainty and risk. The analysis identified state maturity and democratic strength as two major factors.
Therefore, it is pertinent to say that, in absolute terms, the freedom to manoeuvre for welfare is indeed compromised by economic globalization, but in directly addressing the question about the impact of economic globalization on the welfare state, the welfare state certainly remains resilient with its own means of mitigating the negative effects of economic globalization. This is particularly true because only the poor developing countries, whom we do not traditionally consider to be strongly welfare states at all, face the most reduction in welfare. Thus, with the notion of the traditional welfare state defined by Cameron (1978) in mind, the impact of economic globalization has indeed been mild on the welfare state. The prospects for these mature welfare states remain promising even in the face of growing uncertainty, as they can be assured of their capacity for state intervention if faced with negative market fluctuations of expanding international capital flows, interconnectedness, risk and uncertainty.
References
Introduction
With the advent of economic globalization in our contemporary world, questions have been asked about the predicament of the welfare state in the face of increasing free market-orientation. Three viewpoints can be readily and broadly identified. Pessimistic outlooks for the welfare state describe it as being in crisis (Mishra, 1984), under threat (Lowe, 1999a), retrenched (Mishra, 1990) or even dismantled (Community Development Project, 1977). Yet, in direct opposition to such pessimism, there are arguments that the welfare state remains as resilient or robust as ever (Le Grand, 1991) and there is still much hope yet for worldwide welfare (Greve, 2006). Still, there are considerations made to access the reality in more neutral terms that attempt to capture the durability of the traditional welfare state, while at the same time not discounting the inevitable changes that modern economic globalization brings about. The welfare states in such a perspective have been thought to be in transition (Johnson, 1987; Esping-Andersen, 1996), refashioned (Wicks, 1987), reshaped (Johnson, 1990), restructured (Sullivan, 1996; Wilding, 1992), reconstructed (Johnson, 1990), and recalibrated (Ferrera, Hemerijck & Rhodes, 2001).
Welfare statism, whose policies is considered socialist and of a state-controlled and redistributive nature, is considered to be opposed to economic globalization which is popularly regarded as the propagation of free markets and liberalization. Economic globalization has been defined as the expansion of international trade in goods and services, increasing international flow of capital, internationalization of production through transnational corporations and global commodity chains, growing significance and role of supra-state organizations, and increased propagation of liberal virtues and economic ideas (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005). Further, the definition of economic globalization can be refined for the purposes of this paper to include greater interconnectedness, greater emphasis on efficiency and a generally increasing transference of the responsibility of provisions from state to corporation. These traits of economic globalization give rise to the popular sentiment that the welfare state is losing its power of control and autonomy over public expenditure to the distributive determination of the free market.
What truly then constitutes an accurate portrayal of the predicament of the welfare state in these trying times of economic globalization? What has changed across the world with regards to welfare, and do all changes occur at the same rate? If there are indeed changes abound, what then is the significance of these differentials and what mitigates the impact brought on by economic globalization which lead to these different rates of change? What, indeed if any, are the prospects for the welfare state?
Habermas (2001b) describes the dilemma that national governments face today as being derived from the zero-sum game which dictates that optimal economic goals can be reached only at the expense of social and political objectives. Welfare restructuring has been a universal phenomenon particularly over the last twenty years (Stephens, 2005). Bonoli and colleagues (2000) define four main factors of economic globalization that pressure the ‘retrenchment’ of the welfare state. First, globalization imposes inescapable competition on states, constraining the autonomy of national policies particularly towards taxation and labour. Secondly, there is a decreasing tolerance for taxation to fund welfare interests. As international markets expand, taxes have to be reduced in order to compete internationally for foreign investment and prevent capital flight. Thirdly, states are increasingly adopting a neo-liberal stance in policy-making. Lastly, there is a ‘squaring of the welfare circle’, referring to the simultaneous and contradictory pressures from opposite directions experienced by governments. Higher spending is demanded to counter the rises in ageing population, demand for education and training, unemployment, and expectations that social progress involves higher standards of service. Yet concurrently, contraction of state provision is called for in view of the concern about the impact of globalization, the logic of liberalism and fears of tax revolt.
In the light of economic globalization, economic power has steadily become the new currency for political power. This is echoed by Habermas (2001b) as he states that “power can be democratized; money cannot” and that “money replaces power” in the new economic world order, which has also outlawed war, colonialism and coercion (Ikenberry, 2008). But is this really happening and, if so, to what extent? To access the impact and its extent of economic globalization, this paper will turn to a regional analysis of the alleged decline of the welfare state in Europe and Asia. This will be carried out by looking at general markers of social and welfare orientation in states such as employment, poverty and inequality levels, social benefits and levels of freedom of movement of states in policy-making, such as taxation and social security provision.
Decline of European Welfare
European welfare states have been described as the most well-developed and extensive (Sapir, 2005), where many countries enjoyed full employment during the golden era of the post-war Keynesian welfare state. In spite of this, there is an increasing general consensus that a great degree of social legislation introduced in recent years has subordinated welfare to primary neoliberal interests (Bonoli et al., 2000). With Sweden as a case in point, the increase in unemployment from 2% in the late 1980s to 9.5% in 1993 is the most obvious implication of the impact of economic globalization (Stephens, 1996), and this was echoed in other Nordic countries. Sweden had to utilize an austerity package and other crisis measures in order to combat an economic crisis in 1990, leading to reductions in social benefits (Olsson & McMurphy, 1993; Stephens, 1996). This trend of austerity has been found in the rest of Europe as well, in what Pierson (2001) terms the ‘politics of austerity’. Unemployment has since stayed at a historical high of around 8% which signalled a ‘paradigm shift’ away from trying to restore full employment. Freer movement of money and capital has inevitably resulted in greater integration of the Swedish economy in the global market place (Mishra, 1999), resulting in a diminished ability of the state to exercise political power over the citizenry, let alone redistribute in favour of welfare. Real interest rates increased from 1.4% in the 1960s to 5.6% in the early 1990s (OECD, 1995), which was caused by the elimination of controls of international and domestic financial markets. Interest rates then became more susceptible to determination by the market rather than governments. International competition pressured prices and taxes to be kept lower, compromising the post-war social contract whereby the state and tax payers fed welfare (Cox, 1987). An ideological shift, particularly in Britain, was called for towards the neoliberal consensus as Margaret Thatcher imposed radical reforms in favour of capital over labour. From this, another feature of European states emerging, altered, from a strongly welfare structure is the shifting of the burden of uncertainty from the government to the individual. Studies have found that social security and risk-protection has declined as dependence on the market increases (Bonoli et al., 2000). At any rate, the golden era of the post-war Keynesian welfare state in Europe is no longer relevant in today’s global context marked by economic globalization (Kwiek, 2007).
Decline of Asian Welfare
The forecast for the welfare state in Asia appears equally, if not more, bleak. In Asia and other developing nations, state-citizenry relations have been largely paternalistic until recent global economic development which saw them opening up to trade. Trade has often led to a significant undermining of the state’s sovereignty and ability to ensure public social security. As is observed, many corporations from the economic core have entered developing Asian countries to capitalize on lower costs and have thus dictated the lives of many underprivileged according to the forces of the market. The focus on comparative advantages has also led some Asian countries with inexpensive labour and cheap natural resources to a ‘race to the bottom’ which leaves them exposed to exploitation (Rudra, 2008).
As China and India continue to pursue greater integration with the world economy, other Asian countries are facing increased competition for markets, foreign capital and labour. In the attempt to gain opportunities in participating in the growth of China and India, social policies have been compromised (Asher & Nandy, 2006). Poverty has increased from the declining ability of the state in providing welfare particularly to rural areas as well as in cushioning the increasing prices of necessities, such as food. For example, in Vietnam where poverty has risen, over 20% of the rural population cannot meet their daily nutritional requirements even if they were to spend all of their income on basic food supplies (Chandrasiri & de Silva, 1996). In the case of South Korea, economic globalization led to a social contract crisis, as strong economic growth was not complemented with necessary socio-political development. The lack of proper institutional resources to counter the impact of economic globalization led to rising unemployment in South Korea from 2.5% before the 1997 Asian financial crisis to 9% between 1998 to 1999, and poverty rose by four-to-fivefold (Harris, 2002). The greatest beneficiaries of economic globalization – China and India – are also not spared from the negative welfare consequences of their rush to develop economically, as rising poverty and inequality plague particularly the lives of non-elites (Sahoo, 2007).
The Impact of Economic Globalization on Europe and Asia: The Verdict
An objective analysis of the general trend of Asia and Europe would definitely point to the undermining of the capacity of the state to provide for welfare by economic globalization. In both regions, capital interconnectedness has led to market dependence that is shaped by all who participate in it, such that the degree of freedom of one state to make decisions for itself is diminished as the effects of its policy-making is pegged to outcomes elsewhere. Likewise, a crisis in one part of the world has the ability to affect the stability of states in another area of the globe (Krugman, 2008). The decreasing ability of states to exercise traditional sovereignty in taxation and the waging of war, increasing unemployment, subordination of social benefits to economic gains and rising inequality have surfaced along with economic globalization. Advocates of the decline of the welfare state will see the absolute reduction in state power to provide welfare as evidence that the welfare state is in crisis.
Rebuttal Against the Decline of Welfare
In spite of the evidence highlighting the attack of economic globalization on welfare states and welfare provision around the world, a body of literature exists that argues against the demise of the welfare state. Mature welfare states in the world, particularly exemplified by northwestern Europe, have been found to be robustly durable against social erosion brought about by globalization thus far (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005). A large part of their GDP has gone towards public funding. An analysis of this, as will be discussed later, indicates that when there are newly-created social security issues that cannot be countered by traditional forms of direct intervention, strong states have the capacity to and will attempt to channel resources elsewhere to ‘make up’ for it. A host of reasons motivate this, but the general direction that states choose to implement these policies is still oriented in the way of social protection. These findings are also bolstered by assessing the reaction of South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines towards both economic globalization and the 1997 international financial crisis. In all countries, the global and economic repercussions only served to re-ignite interest in social policy as an important aspect of state policy in order to counter the risks and uncertainties brought about by economic globalization. There is also more awareness of the growing domestic demands for social policies, including population ageing, shifts towards more technologically-based economies and urbanization (Gough, 2001).
On the whole, although welfare state restructuring has led to some blurring of regime styles, there are no clear indicators of any complete overhaul of the boundaries that have defined welfare state models of these mature welfare states in the post-war period. This applies particularly to modes of financing, personal coverage and benefit provision. Some quantitative changes have occurred, but all countries qualitatively still exhibit strong similarities to the welfare state make-up inherited from the past (Obinger, Starke & Moser, 2009). These rejections of the idea that the welfare state is in decline also propose that the prospects for the welfare state, regardless of economic globalization, are still as promising as ever.
Mitigation of Anti-Welfare: What Accounts for it?
It must be noted that, historically, trade dependency and perceived economic vulnerability in the open economy of Europe enhanced the domestic power of labour and produced a strongly ingrained ideology of social partnership, leading to the formation of institutionally comprehensive welfare states that served as a security blanket against the vicissitudes of world markets (Cameron, 1978). Immunity against the harmful effects of globalization for these mature welfare states is thus constituted by their strong and prolonged historical integration into the world market, successful fiscal and international trade policy-making, a sustainable domestic balance of power between unions and government, a strong ‘naturalization’ of welfare generosity where social benefits are popular and difficult to eradicate, the ability to adapt and evolve to remain globally relevant, and economic and political stability both domestically and internationally which negates the need for dependence on international organizations (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005).
In many cases, the highly productive economies of these mature welfare states are supported by their socially-oriented policies, and the institutional structures of such mature welfare states are also deeply embedded and have been found to persist even in the face of unpopularity. Additionally, social policy in once strongly welfare states that have evolved into advanced capitalist societies can operate through state intervention to compensate for the inadequate welfare outcomes of the labour market (Gough & Wood, 2004). In so doing, these advanced capitalist societies have retained the very feature of their original strong welfare orientations. The generous welfare states of northwestern Europe were built in open economies around the interests of exposed sector employers and workers. Therefore, social policy was not only compatible with export competition but also contributed to competitiveness by enabling wage restraint and providing collective goods valued by employers, such as labour training (Huber & Stephens, 2005). Welfare state resilience in spite of economic integration even suggests that the effects of economic globalization may not be all that detrimental to welfare states, directly challenging the presently mainstream view echoed by Habermas (2001) that welfare is opposed to economic globalization. Trade is a source of economic growth which may generate fiscal resources necessary for welfare states to remain (Obinger, Starke & Moser, 2009).
In the case of northwestern Europe, while social benefits have not been significantly cut, taxation has been increased against the odds of global market pressure to make pension schemes still viable, clearly indicating the ideological durability of civil society towards welfare and the stubbornness of the social contract in major parts of Europe. In an assessment of welfare transformation in small open economies, welfare dismantling, notably in unemployment cash benefits, was strongly compensated for by expansion in other welfare aspects such as family policy or long-term care (Obinger, Starke & Moser, 2009). Even if economic globalization constrained social expenditure in states, some of these pension and wage modifications merely resulted in a modestly declining rate of welfare expenditure at most, but did little to turn around the fact that welfare expenditure still remained high and formed the primary proportion of state budgets. While there was a decline in welfare state expansion and an increase in private sector growth, public social service employment remained strong especially when contrasted to the increased unemployment that the private sector in most countries face now. Bureaucratic constraints also continued to work against radical departures from established welfare state models (Pierson, 1996).
On the other hand, however, the tendency for welfare and social provisions to be diminished by economic globalization has been found to be more prevalent in poorer developing countries (Garrett & Nickerson, 2005). Many lower and middle-income countries face balance-of-payments problems due to imperfect integration into the world economy which often leaves them vulnerable to intervention by international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. From such a perspective, conditions enforced by external entities thus compromise more strongly on the automony of these countries and, likewise, their public is subjected to pressures and harms brought about by economic globalization without the social safety nets that developed states can provide. Developing countries also compete based on the comparative advantage of cheap labour, which places them in a locked-in position where their social security is often undermined by corporate interests (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005). Here, the negative impact of economic globalization as documented in the earlier section where the ‘race to the bottom’ was referred to becomes more evident. Some states, such as India, have compromised on food self-sufficiency by struggling to gain competitive advantages in niches that serve the only interests of affluent purchasers, leading to food insecurity (Sharma, 2000). While developed states can retain their welfare regimes to bolster the effects of economic globalization and even use social policy to reap further gains from the market, such welfare regimes cannot easily be produced in poorer regions of the world where states suffer problems of governance and labour markets are imperfect and partial (Gough & Wood, 2004).
A state’s level of democratization also creates another dimension along which the effects of economic globalization on welfare either become more pronounced or diluted. Democratization was found to significantly mediate the expected decrease in government spending dynamics due to economic globalization. In countries that became more democratic between the 1980s to the 1990s, increasing market integration was associated with much faster growth in state spending, but the opposite was true in countries that did not democratize (Garrett & Nickerson, 2005). This phenomenon is accounted for by the democratizing state’s increasing ability to adapt and evolve to remain globally relevant. The political stability of democracies breeds stronger governments with better policy-making abilities, allowing these democratized states to grow economically and indulge in greater public spending (Glatzer & Rueschemeyer, 2005). Welfare groups also gain political strength through democratic regimes where values of liberty and freedom are espoused. With greater communication channels between various civil society groups and international bodies created by economic globalization, different welfare and social groups have a greater voice in protesting against various features of globalization (Graham, 2002). Here, the same tools of international communication that facilitate economic globalization are used in opposition to the social insecurities economic globalization brings about. The multitude of issues and agendas – both domestic as well as global – that came together in opposition to the World Trade Organization in Seattle as an example, illustrate the diversity of sources of opposition to globalizing strategies of capital and states, particularly to those strategies which ignore health, social and environment protection (Yeates, 2001). Democratization positively correlates with states’ level of development, which further strengthens the view that development is a mitigating factor for the impact of economic globalization on welfare.
A General Framework of Welfare State Vulnerability
With a clear distinction identified between developed and developing countries in terms of welfare state vulnerability, a more concise framework that captures the impact of economic globalization can hence be formulated.
First, whether states react well to globalization is structured by their status within the global political economy. Second, states’ room for manoeuvre in pursuing and implementing globalizing strategies is mediated by national social, demographic, cultural and economic trends, institutions and traditions. Third, states’ margin of operation is determined by the balance of political power between the state, labour, capital and civil society. Put simply, there are strong differences between what different states can ‘get away with’ and developing states simply flounder on every aspect. Despite the supposed overarching power of globalization, the national balance of political power may be decisive in respect of how far national states can accommodate globalization (Yeates, 2001). The tendency for the welfare of developing states to be detrimentally affected by economic globalization therefore exists, as they lack the sound political, industrial and social infrastructures to weather the storm.
Democratization and economic globalization, taken together, also promote the growth of public spending rather than prevent it. Democratic welfare policies strengthen democratic citizenship by giving material and organizational support to subordinate groups and by reducing differences in social status and social power (Rueschemeyer, 2001). Thus, social welfare decreased accordingly when countries globalized and integrated in the world market economy but did not democratize (Adsera & Boix, 2001).
Conclusion
Economic globalization has undeniably led to restructuring of the welfare state. However, whether such restructuring can be seen as a decline in the welfare state – as undermining the strength of the state’s ability for welfare provision – is doubtful. Some countries have displayed remarkable resolve in curtailing the effects of economic globalization by channelling more resources towards maintaining welfare provisions, even if the state’s autonomy is diminished. The state merely has to demonstrate an attempt to curtail the effects of economic globalization to still remain relevant as ‘socially-oriented’.
However, not all countries have displayed the same capacity to deal with economic globalization and provide alternative forms of welfare support in the face of increased market dependence, uncertainty and risk. The analysis identified state maturity and democratic strength as two major factors.
Therefore, it is pertinent to say that, in absolute terms, the freedom to manoeuvre for welfare is indeed compromised by economic globalization, but in directly addressing the question about the impact of economic globalization on the welfare state, the welfare state certainly remains resilient with its own means of mitigating the negative effects of economic globalization. This is particularly true because only the poor developing countries, whom we do not traditionally consider to be strongly welfare states at all, face the most reduction in welfare. Thus, with the notion of the traditional welfare state defined by Cameron (1978) in mind, the impact of economic globalization has indeed been mild on the welfare state. The prospects for these mature welfare states remain promising even in the face of growing uncertainty, as they can be assured of their capacity for state intervention if faced with negative market fluctuations of expanding international capital flows, interconnectedness, risk and uncertainty.
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Wicks, M. (1987). A Future for All. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Wilding, P. (1992). The British welfare state: Thatcherism’s enduring legacy. Policy and Politics, 20, 201-212.
Yeates, N. (2001). Globalization and Social Policy. London: Sage Publishing.
Is Democracy A Universal Value? (2008)
POSC003 Term Paper
This paper seeks to address whether the value of democracy as an ideology is a universal one. This paper first chronicles the proliferation of democracy as a western value through the mechanism of globalisation. It then argues for the universality of the value of democracy by zooming in on the applicability of the foundations of the temple of democracy, and then against it when we consider the impact of the advent of democracy. This paper then argues that democracy may not be all that universal a value.
Before we begin, it is important to define what a universal value is. It can be said that something is of universal value when it has the same value for a great number of people. This could mean two importantly different things. First, something could have universal value when everybody holds it in common in many places and situations and at almost all times, whether consciously and explicitly or as expressed in their behaviour (Jahanbegloo, 1992). Second, something could have universal value when all people have reason to believe it has value. Amartya Sen (1999) interprets it this way, pointing out that when Mahatma Gandhi argued that non-violence is a universal value, he was arguing that all people have reason to value non-violence, not that all people currently value non-violence. For the purpose of this paper’s discussion, we will define that something is of universal value if it is popularly deemed to be of worth in the minds of its practitioners, has a tendency to occur and exhibits positive returns when utilised or practiced.
Mancur Olson’s Dictatorship, Democracy and Development (1993) brought to light the potential economic prosperity that democracy brings about. When John Hancock signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776, it paved the way towards American democracy. The opening of the Declaration of Independence states as follows: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” President Abraham Lincoln succinctly explained the central importance of the Declaration to American history in his Gettysburg address of 1863: "Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." The ideas expressed are generally considered the foundations of American democracy. Under democratic rule, America’s economy flourished.
While democracy enhances growth of emerging economies as the favourable effects on economic growth include maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption and high human capital (Barro, 1996), it is also hard to deny that globalisation - in the sentiment of the 'Americanisation of the world' - is a huge mover of democracy. Between 1975 and 2002, there was a quadrupling in the number of democratic countries. Over the same period, global trade as a share of GDP rose from 7.7 to 19.5 per cent. The share of countries open to international capital flows, as measured by the International Monetary Fund, rose from 25 to 38 per cent. The idea that globalisation promotes the diffusion of democratic ideas dates back to Kant (1795). Authors such as Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1959) and Hayek (1960) have argued that free trade and capital flows, by enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation, raise incomes and lead to the economic development that in turn fosters demands for democracy (Eichengreen & Leblang, 2006).
Essentially, the affluence, technological development and economic development synonymous with American culture, with the onset of globalisation in today's modern world, results in a widespread proliferation of democratic values. Under the impact of globalization, public institutions and societies across the world are becoming increasingly detraditionalised. With the onset of American values, cultural values of non-western societies then become eroded. Additionally, attempts to democratize Islamic countries have proven futile. It then becomes pertinent to question if the values of democracy are all that universally acceptable.
We can attempt to begin answering this by first examining the pillars of the temple of democracy and their degrees of universality. In particular, the pillar of economic well-being can be safely qualified to be of a worthy aspiration for any society that seeks development and prosperity, as it is hard to envisage anybody who wishes to be caught in the throes of economic instability and uncertainty. The pillar of rights and liberties is also of considerable importance and value. In Susan Moller Okin’s Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (1999), it is noteworthy that women affected by polygamy regard it as an inescapable and barely tolerable institution in their African countries of origin, and an unbearable imposition in the French context. This is one example out of many others that demonstrates that, traditionally, people whose personal freedoms are marginalized by their own cultures conform only reluctantly and do aspire towards the emancipation of individual rights and liberties. The pillar of popular sovereignty is perhaps less universal as it comes about from the attainment of rights and liberties, as citizens may then wish to exercise their right to have a say in the governing of the state, especially minority groups. But its basis of rights and liberties is still of worthy value and hence popular sovereignty can still be considered a derivative function of worthy value itself. As these foundational pillars have universal worth, it percolates into the apparent universality of democratic values, especially those of freedom, equality, trust, equity, respect, tolerance compromise and inclusion.
On a macro level, especially in terms of the perpetuation of peace and stability, democracy as a political ideology also garners weight. The democratic peace theory holds that conflicts and wars are rare between democracies, and that systematic violence is in general less common within democracies, as there is empirical evidence of the relationship between democracy and peace. As compared to other forms of rule, such as that of communism, anarchy, dictatorship or autocracy, democracy has put itself in very promising light despite being a comparatively recent global phenomenon.
Thus far, it is apparent that democracy is quite a desirable ideal because we are aware of the stability and development it can bring about, as well as the inherent goodness that undergirds it. However, once we consider the impact and consequences of the application of democracy, the argument that the value of democracy is universal becomes contentious.
One consideration is in the case of the necessity of ‘prerequisites’ for democracy to be successful. Civic culture as a prerequisite can be traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1840), where it was thought that the reasons why democracy worked in America was due to the eagerness of the Americans to take part in their government as well as the role of religion. In a more recent literature, Almond and Verba argued in The Civic Culture (1963) that a political culture, with a mixture of both participative and deferential components, would have a more suitable climate for democracy as compared to solely participative or subject-oriented cultures. Thirdly, in Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy (1993), Putnam et al. asserts that a civic culture founded upon a reciprocity of mutual trust and cooperation amongst its citizens makes democracy work. Another prerequisite is a developed and stable socioeconomic climate. According to the logic of Human Development Theory, socioeconomic development allows more resources at the disposal of individuals and people become more educated and demand more liberty. This in turn leads to the cultivation of emancipative values and subsequently the demand for democratization (Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann, 2003). Arend Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms & Performance in Thirty-six Countries (1999) further contends that institutional structure is another vital prerequisite for the political stability of democracy.
These can be highlighted in the example of Iraq, where the efforts to build a democratically-oriented political elite in post-Saddam Iraq has proven arduous due to the lack of prerequisites. Although there are respected and capable leaders from Iraq’s diverse communities who are committed to a democratic future, they have had difficulty surmounting their divisions and making compromises. Moreover, the “disadvantaged” in Iraq includes many people who have suffered discrimination or economic deprivation both under Saddam Hussein and in the aftermath of his departure. It is evident that support for democracy among the urban and rural poor is very weak. Many impoverished and poorly educated people have flocked to the cause of authority figures who offer handouts and the psychological rewards of combating the western occupiers as well as domestic enemies. Without a radical improvement in the economy, it is not likely that the members of Iraq’s economic underclass will move towards democracy, unless they are led there by leaders they respect (Sodaro, 2004).
This need for prerequisites before a democracy can be successful evidently argues that democracy is not such a universal value, as the socioeconomic and political climate of a country needs to be specifically ‘tweaked’ before democracy can be applicable and accepted by its people. This can be further demonstrated when we take into account that there are a considerable number of variants of direct democracy, namely social democracy, representative democracy, parliamentary democracy and a host of other less common forms of democracy, such as participatory democracy, anticipatory democracy and deliberative democracy. People differ over the minimum levels or standards of popular sovereignty, civil rights and liberties, and economic well-being for a desirably functioning democracy. Inevitably, what some people may regard as maximum forms of democracy may be regarded by others as minimal forms of democracy (Sodaro, 2004). Clearly, what works for one country might not work for another. States ‘borrow’ democratic ideals to varying degrees to suit their own political needs, and some of these states are merely carrying out their own undemocratic political agendas under the guise of democracy, such as Malaysia. Robert Dahl’s How Democratic is the American Constitution? (2001) also states that America faced problems engaging in direct democracy and had to resort to a representative democracy instead. This subjectivity also undermines the universality of democracy.
In addition, the gains from democracy thus far have been judged largely on material and individual grounds. Who's to say that the other things we have compromised by advocating democracy are less important? Robert D. Putnam’s Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community addresses the declining social capital within democracies, as compared to the high levels of social capital in traditional non-western societies. Since 1950, America’s social capital has been in decline as the individualistic nature of democracy undermines active civil engagement. Democratic ideals are predominantly western concepts. With the proliferation of democracy throughout the world, western values pertaining to an egalitarian society, personal freedom and liberty, etc. then become pervasive. Although this brings about economic growth, with higher education and a greater emphasis on the self, this leads to an erosion of traditional values, especially those of the family and community. People become more self-aware and prioritise a sense of need for self-actualisation and post-modern wants above traditional institutions, such as marriage (Saardchom & Lemaire, 2005). There are also many whose traditional and cultural livelihoods are being threatened by the increasingly dominant trend of democracy globally. Anthony Giddens’ Runaway World highlights the disorder and instability that democratization in an increasingly globalised modern world brings. In essence, many societies are overhauling what were once perceived as their universal values in place of the new value of democracy in this process of detraditionalisation. Democracy as a universal value becomes questionable once more.
From the discussion of arguments for and against democracy so far, it can be seen that democratic values have inherent goodness and its successful application can bring about universally desirable circumstances of peace, stability and development. However, it is not always readily applicable. The need for prerequisites highlights the fact that many societies do not inherently tend towards a culture that accepts the practice of democracy. And when we consider direct democracy in its most ideal sense, hardly any country fully adopts its full-fledged and pure state, implementing other varieties of democracy instead which shows that the essence of democracy is not fundamentally universal in practice. Lastly, the onset of democracy erodes non-western cultures and values. No one is in a position to truly assert whether personal rights and liberties are more important than a spirit of community. It must, however, be noted that this paper is not trying to say that we should not strive towards democratic ideals. In modifying Amartya Sen’s argument, a country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it can become fit through democracy. Fundamentally, this paper asserts that, based on the definition of ‘universal value’ as proposed in the introduction, the arguments discussed have shown that the value of democracy falls short of being universal.
References:
This paper seeks to address whether the value of democracy as an ideology is a universal one. This paper first chronicles the proliferation of democracy as a western value through the mechanism of globalisation. It then argues for the universality of the value of democracy by zooming in on the applicability of the foundations of the temple of democracy, and then against it when we consider the impact of the advent of democracy. This paper then argues that democracy may not be all that universal a value.
Before we begin, it is important to define what a universal value is. It can be said that something is of universal value when it has the same value for a great number of people. This could mean two importantly different things. First, something could have universal value when everybody holds it in common in many places and situations and at almost all times, whether consciously and explicitly or as expressed in their behaviour (Jahanbegloo, 1992). Second, something could have universal value when all people have reason to believe it has value. Amartya Sen (1999) interprets it this way, pointing out that when Mahatma Gandhi argued that non-violence is a universal value, he was arguing that all people have reason to value non-violence, not that all people currently value non-violence. For the purpose of this paper’s discussion, we will define that something is of universal value if it is popularly deemed to be of worth in the minds of its practitioners, has a tendency to occur and exhibits positive returns when utilised or practiced.
Mancur Olson’s Dictatorship, Democracy and Development (1993) brought to light the potential economic prosperity that democracy brings about. When John Hancock signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776, it paved the way towards American democracy. The opening of the Declaration of Independence states as follows: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” President Abraham Lincoln succinctly explained the central importance of the Declaration to American history in his Gettysburg address of 1863: "Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." The ideas expressed are generally considered the foundations of American democracy. Under democratic rule, America’s economy flourished.
While democracy enhances growth of emerging economies as the favourable effects on economic growth include maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption and high human capital (Barro, 1996), it is also hard to deny that globalisation - in the sentiment of the 'Americanisation of the world' - is a huge mover of democracy. Between 1975 and 2002, there was a quadrupling in the number of democratic countries. Over the same period, global trade as a share of GDP rose from 7.7 to 19.5 per cent. The share of countries open to international capital flows, as measured by the International Monetary Fund, rose from 25 to 38 per cent. The idea that globalisation promotes the diffusion of democratic ideas dates back to Kant (1795). Authors such as Schumpeter (1950), Lipset (1959) and Hayek (1960) have argued that free trade and capital flows, by enhancing the efficiency of resource allocation, raise incomes and lead to the economic development that in turn fosters demands for democracy (Eichengreen & Leblang, 2006).
Essentially, the affluence, technological development and economic development synonymous with American culture, with the onset of globalisation in today's modern world, results in a widespread proliferation of democratic values. Under the impact of globalization, public institutions and societies across the world are becoming increasingly detraditionalised. With the onset of American values, cultural values of non-western societies then become eroded. Additionally, attempts to democratize Islamic countries have proven futile. It then becomes pertinent to question if the values of democracy are all that universally acceptable.
We can attempt to begin answering this by first examining the pillars of the temple of democracy and their degrees of universality. In particular, the pillar of economic well-being can be safely qualified to be of a worthy aspiration for any society that seeks development and prosperity, as it is hard to envisage anybody who wishes to be caught in the throes of economic instability and uncertainty. The pillar of rights and liberties is also of considerable importance and value. In Susan Moller Okin’s Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (1999), it is noteworthy that women affected by polygamy regard it as an inescapable and barely tolerable institution in their African countries of origin, and an unbearable imposition in the French context. This is one example out of many others that demonstrates that, traditionally, people whose personal freedoms are marginalized by their own cultures conform only reluctantly and do aspire towards the emancipation of individual rights and liberties. The pillar of popular sovereignty is perhaps less universal as it comes about from the attainment of rights and liberties, as citizens may then wish to exercise their right to have a say in the governing of the state, especially minority groups. But its basis of rights and liberties is still of worthy value and hence popular sovereignty can still be considered a derivative function of worthy value itself. As these foundational pillars have universal worth, it percolates into the apparent universality of democratic values, especially those of freedom, equality, trust, equity, respect, tolerance compromise and inclusion.
On a macro level, especially in terms of the perpetuation of peace and stability, democracy as a political ideology also garners weight. The democratic peace theory holds that conflicts and wars are rare between democracies, and that systematic violence is in general less common within democracies, as there is empirical evidence of the relationship between democracy and peace. As compared to other forms of rule, such as that of communism, anarchy, dictatorship or autocracy, democracy has put itself in very promising light despite being a comparatively recent global phenomenon.
Thus far, it is apparent that democracy is quite a desirable ideal because we are aware of the stability and development it can bring about, as well as the inherent goodness that undergirds it. However, once we consider the impact and consequences of the application of democracy, the argument that the value of democracy is universal becomes contentious.
One consideration is in the case of the necessity of ‘prerequisites’ for democracy to be successful. Civic culture as a prerequisite can be traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1840), where it was thought that the reasons why democracy worked in America was due to the eagerness of the Americans to take part in their government as well as the role of religion. In a more recent literature, Almond and Verba argued in The Civic Culture (1963) that a political culture, with a mixture of both participative and deferential components, would have a more suitable climate for democracy as compared to solely participative or subject-oriented cultures. Thirdly, in Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy (1993), Putnam et al. asserts that a civic culture founded upon a reciprocity of mutual trust and cooperation amongst its citizens makes democracy work. Another prerequisite is a developed and stable socioeconomic climate. According to the logic of Human Development Theory, socioeconomic development allows more resources at the disposal of individuals and people become more educated and demand more liberty. This in turn leads to the cultivation of emancipative values and subsequently the demand for democratization (Welzel, Inglehart & Klingemann, 2003). Arend Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms & Performance in Thirty-six Countries (1999) further contends that institutional structure is another vital prerequisite for the political stability of democracy.
These can be highlighted in the example of Iraq, where the efforts to build a democratically-oriented political elite in post-Saddam Iraq has proven arduous due to the lack of prerequisites. Although there are respected and capable leaders from Iraq’s diverse communities who are committed to a democratic future, they have had difficulty surmounting their divisions and making compromises. Moreover, the “disadvantaged” in Iraq includes many people who have suffered discrimination or economic deprivation both under Saddam Hussein and in the aftermath of his departure. It is evident that support for democracy among the urban and rural poor is very weak. Many impoverished and poorly educated people have flocked to the cause of authority figures who offer handouts and the psychological rewards of combating the western occupiers as well as domestic enemies. Without a radical improvement in the economy, it is not likely that the members of Iraq’s economic underclass will move towards democracy, unless they are led there by leaders they respect (Sodaro, 2004).
This need for prerequisites before a democracy can be successful evidently argues that democracy is not such a universal value, as the socioeconomic and political climate of a country needs to be specifically ‘tweaked’ before democracy can be applicable and accepted by its people. This can be further demonstrated when we take into account that there are a considerable number of variants of direct democracy, namely social democracy, representative democracy, parliamentary democracy and a host of other less common forms of democracy, such as participatory democracy, anticipatory democracy and deliberative democracy. People differ over the minimum levels or standards of popular sovereignty, civil rights and liberties, and economic well-being for a desirably functioning democracy. Inevitably, what some people may regard as maximum forms of democracy may be regarded by others as minimal forms of democracy (Sodaro, 2004). Clearly, what works for one country might not work for another. States ‘borrow’ democratic ideals to varying degrees to suit their own political needs, and some of these states are merely carrying out their own undemocratic political agendas under the guise of democracy, such as Malaysia. Robert Dahl’s How Democratic is the American Constitution? (2001) also states that America faced problems engaging in direct democracy and had to resort to a representative democracy instead. This subjectivity also undermines the universality of democracy.
In addition, the gains from democracy thus far have been judged largely on material and individual grounds. Who's to say that the other things we have compromised by advocating democracy are less important? Robert D. Putnam’s Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community addresses the declining social capital within democracies, as compared to the high levels of social capital in traditional non-western societies. Since 1950, America’s social capital has been in decline as the individualistic nature of democracy undermines active civil engagement. Democratic ideals are predominantly western concepts. With the proliferation of democracy throughout the world, western values pertaining to an egalitarian society, personal freedom and liberty, etc. then become pervasive. Although this brings about economic growth, with higher education and a greater emphasis on the self, this leads to an erosion of traditional values, especially those of the family and community. People become more self-aware and prioritise a sense of need for self-actualisation and post-modern wants above traditional institutions, such as marriage (Saardchom & Lemaire, 2005). There are also many whose traditional and cultural livelihoods are being threatened by the increasingly dominant trend of democracy globally. Anthony Giddens’ Runaway World highlights the disorder and instability that democratization in an increasingly globalised modern world brings. In essence, many societies are overhauling what were once perceived as their universal values in place of the new value of democracy in this process of detraditionalisation. Democracy as a universal value becomes questionable once more.
From the discussion of arguments for and against democracy so far, it can be seen that democratic values have inherent goodness and its successful application can bring about universally desirable circumstances of peace, stability and development. However, it is not always readily applicable. The need for prerequisites highlights the fact that many societies do not inherently tend towards a culture that accepts the practice of democracy. And when we consider direct democracy in its most ideal sense, hardly any country fully adopts its full-fledged and pure state, implementing other varieties of democracy instead which shows that the essence of democracy is not fundamentally universal in practice. Lastly, the onset of democracy erodes non-western cultures and values. No one is in a position to truly assert whether personal rights and liberties are more important than a spirit of community. It must, however, be noted that this paper is not trying to say that we should not strive towards democratic ideals. In modifying Amartya Sen’s argument, a country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it can become fit through democracy. Fundamentally, this paper asserts that, based on the definition of ‘universal value’ as proposed in the introduction, the arguments discussed have shown that the value of democracy falls short of being universal.
References:
- Almond, G. & Verba, S. (1963). The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Barro, R. J. (1996). Democracy and growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1 (1), 1-27.
- Dahl, R. (2001) How Democratic is the American Constitution? Yale: Yale University Press.
- Eichengreen, B. & Leblang, D. (2006), “Democracy and Globalisation”, Working Paper #219, Bank for International Settlements: Monetary and Economic Department.
- Giddens, A. (2000). Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives. New York: Routledge.
- Hayek, F. A. (1960). The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jahanbegloo, R. (1992), Conversations with Isaiah Berlin. London: P. Halban.
- Kant, I. (1795). Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History and Morals. Reprinted 1983, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms & Performance in Thirty-six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959), Some social requisites of democracy: Economic Development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53, 69-105.
- Okin, S. M. (1999). Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Olson, M. (1993), Dictatorship, democracy and development. American Political Science Review, 87 (3), 567-576.
- Putnam, R. D. (1995) Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. Journal of Democracy, 6 (1), 65-78.
- Putnam, R. D. et al (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Saardchom, N. & Lemaire, J. (2005). Causes of increasing ages at marriage: An international regression study. Marriage and Family Review, 37, 73-97.
- Schumpeter, J. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
- Sen, A. (1999), Democracy as a universal value. Journal of Democracy, 10 (3) 3-17.
- Sodaro M. J. (2004). Comparative Politics: A Global Introduction (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Tocqueville de, A. (2000). Democracy in America. (George Lawrence, Trans.; J. P. Mayer, ed.). New York: Perennial Classics. (Original work published 1840).
- Welzel, C., Inglehart, R. & Klingemann, H. D. (2003), The theory of human development: A cross-cultural analysis. European Journal of Political Research, 42, 341-379.
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